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Richard C. Snyder 
Introduction to the 
Hammond Lecture Series 
i 
The Graduate School of the Ohio State University is 
privileged to publish the first Hammond Lectures, which 
were given originally on the successive evenings of 18, 19, 
and 20 October 1976. This event is made possible by the 
thoughtful generosity of a deceased alumnus, Dr. William A. 
Hammond, M.A. 1917 and Ph.D. 1929, whose gift was in­
tended to stimulate a series of presentations focused on the 
American Tradition. 
A faculty committee1 chose for the inaugural occasion the 
theme of "From Abundance to Scarcity: Implications for the 
American Tradition," and selected three distinguished 
scholars—Michael Kammen, Kenneth Boulding, and 
Seymour Martin Lipset—to address the theme from the van­
tage points of their respective disciplines.2 
Thus it was expected that the campus-wide university 
community and (later) the readers of this publication would 
benefit from a kind of multidisciplinary triangulation on a 
very complex subject, i.e., the simultaneous interplay of 
three perspectives: that of the cultural historian (Kammen), 
that of the economist/social scientist (Boulding), and that of 
the political sociologist (Lipset). These scholars are noted 
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not only for their outstanding reputations within single dis­
ciplines but for their unusual capacity and willingness to 
transcend the constraints of specialization in their writing 
and teaching. 
II 
As we all have come to realize, it is not easy to stimulate 
intelligent discourse on significant social and political prob­
lems even in a university setting. The barriers to purposeful, 
provocative, and penetrating exploration of alternative 
ideas and multiple realities that manages to combine depth 
and breadth, knowledge and action, theory-based research 
and policy concerns, are well known. Among the many 
inhibiting factors that wind Liliputian threads around our 
efforts to mount sustained public dialogues that might en­
rich and clarify thought and decision are, of course, such 
familiar ones as: the confusing effects of the use of diverse 
specialized vocabularies, recurrent confrontations of dog­
matic arguments, the deliberate manipulation of empty or 
ambiguous symbols to shape attitudes or behaviors, the lack 
of widely shared societal memories of key past events rele­
vant to contemporary issues, and stubborn technical puzzles 
that do not yield easily to solutions, much less to impati­
ence. 
In a very real sense, the 1976 Hammond Lecture theme 
has, as does the cluster of related conditions and sub-issues 
on which it exercises gravitational pull, a dual aspect: on the 
one hand, scarcity and abundance of certain prime resources 
have, as the three lecturers remind us, exerted a profound 
shaping influence on the evolution of the American socio­
political system; on the other hand, the nature, extent, and 
consequences of different amounts—of the supply of any set 
of resources on hand as it were—is also a matter of conflict­
ing perceptions and judgments and not necessarily of objec­
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tively determined actuality. The implied real and perceived 
ramifications, then, suggest the usefulness of a prismatic 
approach that features emphasis on the multifaceted nature 
of the subject. 
But, as noted above, the phenomena and problems em­
braced by the theme are not neatly differentiated and set off 
from other complexities, but rather must be addressed, if at 
all, in what amounts to a modern version of the Tower of 
Babel. Given the amount of "noise" -in our communication 
system, conflicting estimates, predictions, and proposals are 
extremely difficult to sort out and evaluate. Volatile public 
moods play as large a role as technical analyses. Optimists 
and pessimists often present themselves, or at least appear, 
as the dogmatic opponents mentioned earlier. It is increas­
ingly necessary, though it is a sometimes elusive exercise, to 
separate real events from pseudo events that may be created 
by the media, whether intentionally or not. 
Side by side with the cacophony of voices and points of 
view is the sober recognition (and admission) of mounting 
errors in past calculations, and of grave actual or potential 
limitations on economic growth, on general progress, on 
critical resources, on the current stock of analytic tools, and 
on the effectiveness of policy processes. Moreover, it is in­
creasingly suggested that a thoroughgoing redefinition of 
society is required, based on an acceptance of the limits of 
our power, individual and social, to deal with unlimited 
appetites and wants. 
An added complication is that though the uncertainty and 
confusion concerning relevant factual and value judgments 
appears to be pervasive, the open admission of errors and 
limitations is not common to the community's present and 
future citizens and leaders, but appears to be confined to 
scattered groups of experts or to isolated public officials. 
Finally, we might note the juxtaposition of two other 
related factors: first, the apparent lack of coherence in the 
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American tradition itself; second, the inadequacy of availa­
ble theories and models intended to describe and to explain 
American society. With respect to the former, it is obvious 
that latent ambiguities and ambivalences in the American 
belief system once again have been forced to the surface 
because of the effects of great change (whether perceived or 
real) and intense pressure from successive crises. With re­
spect to the latter, the existence and indefinite status of 
diverse theories illustrates the difficulty of empirically ver­
ifying or falsifying such theories in the social sciences, a 
circumstance that often throws discussion back to underly­
ing assumptions, that are also difficult to test. Hence con­
flicts are often resolved by appeal to the ideological prefer­
ences of those who accept particular assumptions. 
Ill 
Even were it possible, it would be offensive to the three 
authors and to the reader to attempt to summarize the con­
tents of these lectures. To anticipate too much would 
preempt the reader's privilege of discovery. To attempt to 
translate what has been said into other words would be 
unwarranted. 
However, we have sketched in certain well-known 
background considerations as a way of signifying the 
urgency and usefulness of what the three writers are saying, 
a way of explaining why the pages that follow are worth 
serious attention. 
In contrast to much that passes for analysis these days, the 
three essays each constitute a depth probe, a peeling back of 
several layers of that which is too frequently taken only at 
surface value, in order to reveal otherwise hidden elements. 
To the extent that the reader really becomes engaged by 
these exercises, he or she should suspend prior judgments 
and reject the notion that neat solutions and final answers 
with reference to the problems and challenges arising from 
Introduction 11 
alternating patterns of abundance and scarcity interacting 
with the American tradition are possible. 
Taken together, the three authors do offer firm grounds — 
empirical, logical, historical, pragmatic, and philosophical 
— for prudent optimism. Contemporary institutions and 
policies can cope effectively with both the opportunity and 
the threat inherent in unforeseen resource scarcities and 
shortages, in the dilemmas that apparently polarize around 
growth and stagnation, and in the age-old counter-pulls 
between wants or needs and the sum total of available means 
to satisfy them. A close examination of the three presenta­
tions will make it clear that this conclusion hardly rests 
simply on an arbitrary selection of optimism over pessimism 
as a socially acceptable posture. The word prudent rightly 
conveys the notion that the authors' judgment at this mo­
ment in time is based on critically important conditions that, 
they urge, must be met if viable adjustments or solutions are 
to be found. 
One strong message from these pages is that there are 
some major pitfalls to be avoided at all costs, and that there is 
a great deal of hard work to be done by leaders, experts, and 
the general public. 
Various kinds of "numbers games" are, of course, being 
played, and will continue to be played. Some are intentional 
efforts to persuade. Others are the result of faulty methods. 
All may be duly reported as news in the media. Opposing 
and noncomparable cases are made for technology as our 
salvation and for technology as primal cause for all our 
difficulties. Almost endless scenarios are composed for one 
future or another regarding the supplies of needed renew­
able and nonrenewable resources, and at the extremes, the 
portraits are totally inconsistent with each other. 
Why have we been wrong so often in our calculations— 
estimates and forecasts? Why are our social and political 
theories so often wrong or irrelevant? Why is it easier for us 
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to explain ex post facto rather than forecast a priori? Why do 
we have so much trouble differentiating and plotting the 
separate paths and interconnections of secular and cyclical 
social change? Why and how do variations in national mood 
concerning economic well-being occur, and what effects do 
they have on institutional responses to crises? 
It is not that such key questions are answered by the 
authors. Rather, it is the imposing justification that they 
offer for devoting much more systematic inquiry and study 
to these questions than we ever have before. 
IV 
Although it is only one way to characterize the three 
papers, it may be useful to underscore their prototypic con­
tributions in the following manner: 
First, all three emphasize, explicitly and implicitly, the 
inseparability of past-present-future in the analysis of, and 
adaptation to, change. Error, distortion, and unpleasant 
surprise arise when each of the three interconnected com­
ponents is treated in isolation, usually by different experts 
and different methods, and informed by different underly­
ing assumptions. Professor Kammen, as we would expect of 
a historian, reminds us that there was a period of scarcity 
before the "abundance" in the theme title came to predomi­
nate. He also reminds us that even during the abundance era, 
there were warnings of future scarcities and, indeed, even 
non-trivial current shortages. Professor Boulding is cen­
trally concerned with evolutionary systems, particularly 
large-scale social systems, with special attention to the ques­
tion of "does evolution have a direction up or down?" that in 
turn involves social entropy and the issue of how past, 
present, and future are functionally related to types of 
change in any system. Professor Lipset, while concentrating 
on the limits to futurology and social science analysis, also 
links persistent failures in forecasting to inadequacies of 
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theories that deal predominately with past events without, 
however, being particularly successful in telling the differ­
ence between what he calls underlying "structural relation­
ships" and "surface events or conditions" that come and go. 
Second, to select and integrate knowledge from various 
disciplines requires a careful delineation of a particular 
problem. Although brief characterizations do violence to the 
richness of the analysis provided, it can be said in general 
that for Professor Boulding the basic problem is: when is 
change progress? For Professor Kammen it is one of "con­
cerned and responsive government" and of societal cohe­
sion in the years ahead when the peace-order-abundance 
gestalt may be weakened or absent, and for Professor Lipset 
the problem is one of avoiding a premature and dysfunc­
tional commitment to a "no-growth" policy. These are not 
incompatible definitions. 
Third, in what larger contextuality is the problem embed­
ded? Professor Lipset emphasizes, but not exclusively, (a) 
the relationship of inadequate analysis and theorizing to 
definitions and alternative solutions of the problem, and (b) 
the strong connection between the viability of democracy 
and abundance, between a no-growth condition and the 
intensification of social conflict. Professor Boulding locates 
the problem of progress in the context of the need for a 
theoretical measure of the direction of evolution (is it "up" 
or "down"), for an operational definition of progress that is 
susceptible to measurements and evaluations, and for a 
strategy of continual creation of new potential. Professor 
Kammen uses cultural history as a broad base from which to 
derive some rules for effective governmental adaptation to 
changing configurations of abundance and scarcity—for 
example, the significance of the interplay of several different 
American institutions at different times during our de­
velopment, the desirability of thinking about alternative 
solutions free of ideological labels or preconceived 
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categories, and an explicit allusion to the fact that our 
forefathers were willing to reexamine and abandon conven­
tional wisdom when it was necessary. 
Fourth, given the technical difficulties inherent in re­
source estimation and protection, and given the very spotty 
record of theorizing and analysis applied to abundance and 
scarcity-especially forecasting-it would appear inevitable 
that a multimethod strategy will be required to bring the 
problem under intellectual and policy control. Each of the 
three authors, in his own way, bears witness to this impor­
tant conclusion. Their respective thrusts are interdependent 
and hence constitute potential components of a comprehen­
sive methodology. 
Professor Boulding is proposing a highly demanding con­
ceptualization of evolutionary systems and of progress, plus 
the design of procedures for evaluating the implementation 
and impact of policies and decisions bearing on the see-saw 
process of movement toward betterment of the human con­
dition. Professor Kammen gives a demonstration of the kind 
of historical analysis that can provide some of the guidelines 
for constructing a developmental model of the U.S. case—a 
method of reconstruction of the past in terms of policy-
relevant, comparative categories applied to both longitudi­
nal and cross-sectional perspectives and to inter­
institutional interaction. Professor Lipset, in offering de­
tailed examples of failures in forecasting and of inadequate 
social research and theories, by strong implication calls for 
new, or at least at present relatively neglected, modes of 
inquiry that will improve our monitoring of "macroscopic 
system trends and tendencies" and provide a sound basis for 
the more accurate and continuous surveillance of those 
"basic structural tendencies" that have been the elusive 
target of our theorizing and that invariably turn out to be 
crucial in the balance between growth and no-growth factors 
and choices. 
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V

The 1976 Hammond Lectures underscore a very well-
known and fundamental characteristic of the American ex­
perience but one which is apparently altogether too easy for 
the society in its collective capacity to forget: simply put, it 
is the interconnection between the positive abundance-
scarcity balance that has prevailed throughout much of our 
history and the relative stability/viability of democratic gov­
ernment. 
Regardless of whether the reader agrees or disagrees with 
these three scholars in their general orientations or in the 
particulars they present, and regardless of what the reader's 
value preferences are, the stakes involved in future de­
velopments of the pattern of abundance and scarcity, in the 
outcome of the growth-no growth debate, are far too conse­
quential to be left either to inadequate knowledge or to our 
aggregated psychological dispositions. 
The risks of the good or bad results of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy seem real enough after reading and rereading 
these provocative essays. 
1. The committee was composed of Edward H. Bowman, dean, College of 
Administrative Science; Jon Cunnyngham, professor, Department of 
Economics; Randall Ripley, chairman, Department of Political Science; 
Richard C. Snyder, director, Mershon Center for Education in National 
Security; and Marvin Zahniser, chairman, Department of History. 
2. Kenneth E. Boulding, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of 
Colorado; Michael Kammen. Chairman, Department of History, Cornell 
University; Seymour Martin Upset, Professor of Political Science and 
Sociology and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 

Kenneth E. Boulding 
The Limits to Progress 
In Evolutionary Systems 
If there is one idea that has dominated the history of the 
United States, it is the idea of progress. Yet analyses of this 
idea are surprisingly rare. Furthermore, in spite of having 
been founded by a rather small revolution, the dominant 
dynamic of the United States has been evolutionary, through 
social mutation (invention), production, and selection. In 
this paper, therefore, I propose to look at the larger question 
of the nature of evolutionary change, and the conditions 
under which change can be identified as progress. 
We start with the large view. Planet Earth, in striking 
contrast to the moon, which is an equilibrium system, has 
been an evolutionary system one suspects almost from its 
beginning. Even before the advent of life there were plate 
tectonics, erogeny, erosion, and atmosphere and ocean for­
mation on the surface of this restless and uneasy planet. 
With the advent of DNA the process of biological evolution 
began, which has always been a disequilibrium process. I 
have defined evolution as ecological interaction under con­
ditions of constantly changing parameters. The change in 
parameters is mutation; the ecological interaction is selec­
tion. Mutation involves genetic change and much more; 
changes for instance, in climate, land forms, atmospheric 
composition, and so on. Selection involves the rise of some 
populations and the decline of others as they interact, mov­
ing at any one time perhaps toward an ecological equilib­
rium that they never attain, for the parameters always 
change before it arrives. Selection, incidentally, in spite of 
Darwin's unfortunate phrase about the struggle for exis­
tence, does not involve very much struggle; it simply in­
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volves the impact of the total environment on the birth rate 
and the death rate of each species. If there is some popula­
tion of the species at which births and deaths are equal, it 
will have a "niche" and will survive. If the death rate ex­
ceeds the birth rate for a sufficient period of time, the species 
population will decline to zero and the species will become 
extinct. 
With the arrival of Adam and Eve evolution on this planet 
went into a new gear. Because of the extraordinary capacity 
of Homo and Mulier sapiens for the creation of artifacts, 
human history (and social evolution, which is practically 
the same thing) is largely the record of the evolution of 
human artifacts. Human artifacts, again, form an ecological 
system, along with biological artifacts. Selection takes place 
through these ecological interactions, and mutations con­
stantly develop new species through the increase in human 
ideas, knowledge, and know-how. Evolution, it should be 
noted, is fundamentally a process in know-how, that is, in 
the genosphere, the sphere of all genetic information that 
spreads round the surface layers of the planet. As Samuel 
Butler said, "A hen is only an egg's way of making another 
egg." The phenotype is just a genetic intermediary. In social 
evolution likewise the process is essentially one in the social 
genosphere, which is virtually identical with what Teilhard 
de Chardin called the "noosphere," that is, the sphere of all 
human knowledge and know-how and its prosthetic devices 
in the shape of books, plans, blueprints, photographs, com­
puters, and so on. 
The first critical question for this paper is whether evolu­
tion has a direction, that is, a "time's arrow" that can be 
measured on some kind of linear scale. This scale need only 
be ordinal, for all we need to know is direction, not mag­
nitude. That is, is there any sense in which evolution can be 
said to go "up" or "down," or even right or left! We are 
familiar with the time's arrow involved in the second law of 
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thermodynamics, which says that entropy continually in­
creases, or, as I prefer to put it, the potential of the universe 
continually diminishes. Is there a similar time's arrow in 
evolution? 
The question is a difficult one, and it may have a number 
of answers. At the simplest level perhaps we can perceive 
evolution as the segregation of entropy, a process by which 
increasing order is created in a part of the universe at the cost 
of still more disorder elsewhere. A parallel, perhaps rather 
unfortunate, would be a society that is continually getting 
poorer, so that per capita real incomes are continually de­
clining, but in which some people get richer at the cost of 
others getting poorer, at a rate even below the average rate of 
impoveri shment. 
The segregation of entropy should provide a theoretical 
measure of the direction of evolution. Unfortunately, it is 
virtually impossible to do this in practice because of the 
sheer difficulties of measuring entropy. We could suppose, 
however, even before biological evolution, that mountain-
building or erogeny represented a local decline in entropy 
and erosion into flat plains a local increase. Mountain-
building, however, must represent some kind of segregation 
of entropy due to the shrinkage of the earth, or whatever it is 
that produces it. Presumably some potential is always 
exhausted even in mountain-building, though it is not easy 
to see what particular kind of potential it is. Biological 
evolution clearly involves the segregation of entropy. Living 
organisms capture energy from the sun and store it chemi­
cally in the biomass. This clearly involves building struc­
tures of lower entropy on the earth at the cost, of course, of 
increasing entropy in the sun. The measurement of this 
change, however, is extremely difficult. In social evolution 
likewise we see processes of increasing entropy: the decay of 
organizations, the decay of empires, the erosion of cultures, 
and economic disvelopment. But we see also the constant 
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re-creation of evolutionary potential in new religions, new 
nations, new knowledge, new cultures, and so on. Social 
entropy, however, is extremely hard to measure, and one 
may well despair of finding an operational solution to this 
concept, important and suggestive though it is. 
The entropy concept has a clear meaning in ther­
modynamics. As we move into other systems, even into 
biological systems, its meaning becomes more metaphorical 
and less clear even though it is frequently suggestive. It is 
more useful, I think, to think of it in a positive form as a 
potential, or "negentropy." Entropy is essentially negative 
potential. The second law then takes the form that if any­
thing happens it is because it had a potential for happening, 
and after it has happened that potential is used up. Stating it 
in this way, however, opens up the evolutionary possibility 
that potential can be re-created, perhaps at the cost of some 
kind of ultimate potential elsewhere, although this is not 
totally clear. We see this, for instance, in the biosphere, 
where every fertilized egg has enormous biological potential 
for producing the organism of which it is a blueprint. As the 
organism grows and develops, it becomes more mature and 
eventually ages, so that this original biological potential is 
gradually used up, until by the time the organism dies it is 
all gone. In the course of their life, however, most organisms 
re-create potential in the form of new fertilized eggs, and the 
whole things starts all over again. 
The concept of evolutionary potential is much trickier. In 
some things—like DNA itself, the development of sex, the 
development of the vertebrate structure, and the develop­
ment of the human brain—we seem to have enormous 
evolutionary potential for a vast variety of new forms. Just 
what this potential consists of, however, and whether it 
involves any diminution of potential elsewhere is extraor­
dinarily hard to say. There is no doubt that evolution in­
volves the segregation of thermodynamic entropy. Whether 
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it involves the segregation of potential in the larger sense we 
do not know; we do not really know whether even the sec­
ond law of thermodynamics applies to the whole universe in 
all its four dimensions of space and time—the ther­
modynamic potential that existed at the beginning of the 
universe may well be re-created at its end, or even by the 
realization of improbable events along the way. 
The next question is whether we could get any over-all 
measure of the direction of evolution through some measure 
of size of the field over which it was operating. Biological 
evolution on the earth might be measured by the over-all size 
or weight of the biomass. This would be "growth" in the 
simplest sense of the word. It is clearly not a very satisfactory 
measure, though not perhaps wholly meaningless. If the 
over-all weight of the biomass on the earth increases, this is 
at least some indication that something is happening. New 
species must be appearing that either utilize a larger propor­
tion of the solar energy that falls on the earth or that have a 
greater capacity to store that energy. This is really a matter of 
the over-all niche of life. If, for instance, life colonized other 
planets so that the biomass of the universe increased, I sup­
pose we might regard this as a positive direction of change, 
that is, "progress"; but it is certainly a very crude measure, 
and it is certainly not what we usually think of as the direc­
tion of evolution. 
Something closer to a perceived direction of evolution 
would be an increase in the complexity of individuals, either 
of the most complex organism of the system or perhaps of the 
average organism. This, again, is closely related to the con­
cept of a diminishing entropy, which in turn is closely 
related to, but not necessarily identical with, the concept of 
increasing order and complexity. The measurement of com­
plexity, however, is no easier than the measure of entropy or 
potential. One suspects that they are not quite the same 
thing. It is certainly not imposible to imagine an evolutio­
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nary development that would diminish the complexity of 
the present and yet increase the evolutionary potential of the 
future. Sometimes it may be the reduction of an overelabo­
rate and useless complexity that creates evolutionary poten­
tial. Nonetheless, as we follow the course of evolution as it is 
recorded in the rocks we do seem to perceive a rather steady 
increase in complexity from the virus to the bacteria, to the 
amoeba, to the many-celled organism, to the fish, to the 
reptile, to the mammal, culminating, of course, from our 
own point of view in the human race. However, just why the 
evolutionary process on earth seems to produce increasing 
complexity is a puzzle. There certainly seems to be little in 
the general theory of mutation and selection to suggest why 
increase in complexity should be the result of the process 
rather than increasing simplicity. The only explanation I can 
think of is the principle that in any ecosystem there is more 
likely to be an empty niche at the upper levels of complexity 
than there is at the lower levels, which will mostly be filled 
anyway by previously developed species. A mutation that 
produces a more complex structure, therefore, has a slightly 
better chance of finding a niche than one that produces a 
more simple structure, and in evolution it is small prob­
abilities of advantage that tip the balance. I am by no means 
sure that this is always true, and it certainly does not consti­
tute any kind of formal proof of the necessity for increasing 
complexity. 
It is not wholly impossible that the observed increase in 
complexity is an incident of the peculiar history of the struc­
ture of planet earth. Many people have speculated, for in­
stance, as to whether the apparent recurrence of some kind 
of geological or climatic catastrophes in the course of ero­
sion, plate tectonics, ice ages, and so on, has not stimulated 
the evolutionary pattern on earth. Each catastrophe, by 
eliminating large numbers of species, creates a whole set of 
new niches and so creates evolutionary potential. But, again, 
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it is not really clear as to why these new potentials have to be 
on the side of complexity rather than on the side of simplic­
ity. If the evolution of human artifacts eventually produced a 
really deadly artificial virus that would eliminate all mam­
mals on earth, the illusion of increasing complexity could 
hardly be sustained, although there would be nobody left to 
worry about it! This may indeed just be another an­
thropomorphic illusion, but it is only in the systems that 
happen to have produced an increase in complexity, even if 
this has been achieved by rather random processes, that 
anybody like ourselves is around to examine it. There may 
be other planets in the universe that have not earth's kind of 
development, but in that case there is probably nobody 
around to talk or think about it. 
In the social systems too we seem to see increasing com­
plexity, from the first eoliths to the elegant flint arrowheads, 
to metals, to the wheel, to agriculture, to machinery, to other 
scientific technology, and to the space lab. Not all societies 
have followed this pattern, and there are many examples of 
societies that have stagnated, or that have even decayed 
toward greater simplicity and lost previously acquired skill 
and know-how. There seems to be, however, certain irrever­
sibility in the development of complexity, in the sense that 
societies with more complex artifacts seem to have a greater 
probability of survival over those with less complex ar­
tifacts, whether through superior threat, superior productiv­
ity, or superior organization. Mere survival value, however, 
it must be emphasized, is not sufficient to give a direction to 
the evolutionary process. The "survival of the fittest" is a 
meaningless metaphor, for it simply means the fittest to 
survive, that is, the survival of the surviving. To put mean­
ing into it, we must know something about what qualities 
lead to survival, that is, a probability-of-survival function, 
and that is another matter altogether. The "survival of the 
fittest" tells us nothing about whether what survives is more 
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complex or bigger or better or in any direction different from 
what did not survive. 
This brings us to the last, and from the social point of view 
the most significant, direction, which is a direction in the 
form of "goodness." Goodness is a value ordering imposed, 
by humans, on the state of the world or even the state of the 
universe. Goodness is what goes up when things get better 
and down when things get worse, always in terms of over-all 
human evaluation. Whether nature or the universe at large 
has over-all values we do not know, though we may surmise. 
The only values we certainly know about are human values. 
There is a curious myth abroad that there is something called 
"nature" in the absence of the human race that is all wise and 
all good, but this is clearly nonsense. If all life on earth were 
suddenly destroyed by the impact of a wandering heavenly 
body, thbi'e .vould be nothing "unnatural" in this. There is 
no senst' outside of human values in which the 999 out of 
1,000 past species that became extinct were "bad." The 
average life of a species indeed seems to be fairly short on the 
cosmic time scale, and the extinction of a species is just as 
natural as the death of an individual. Species are presuma­
bly not programmed for extinction in the way that individu­
als are programmed by their genetic structure for death; but 
the longer a species persists, presumably the greater the 
chance that it will become extinct, simply because there is a 
constantly increasing number of potential competitors as 
evolutionary potential is realized. 
Furthermore, there is no sense in which human artifacts 
are unnatural. They have been produced by processes of 
evolution—the automobile is just as much a species of 
planet earth as is the horse, and it is just as natural. Every 
human artifact has been produced in the course of evolution. 
The fact that it is social evolution rather than biological 
evolution in no way makes it less natural. A value system 
that regards the natural as good and the unnatural as bad will 
Kenneth E. BouJding 25 
not stand up to examination. All things are natural, but some 
are good and some are bad from the point of view of human 
valuation. 
Human valuation does tend to put a direction on the 
evolutionary process, especially, of course, on the process of 
social evolution. Even in regard to biological evolution one 
can test this by asking oneself, If I had a time machine, to 
what epoch of the evolutionary past would I go first? That 
might depend a little on one's specialized interests, but most 
humans would probably opt for visiting the dinosaurs rather 
than the first anaerobic soup, perhaps because we tend to 
value what is most like us, and this is why we see the process 
of evolution as, on the whole, a "progress" toward the 
human race, with the life forms getting more like us all the 
time. The old principle that ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny, meaning that the human being, for instance, 
from the fertilized egg on recapitulates the amoeba, the fish, 
the mammal, and the ape before achieving the splendid birth 
of a human baby, is not quite as fashionable as it used to be, 
but the principle that the human body embodies in itself 
evolutionary memories as it were of the amoeba, the fish, 
and the monkey can hardly be denied. 
What we are talking about here, of course, is a nice, old-
fashioned word, "progress," which simply means that the 
total state of the world, or of some subset of it in which we are 
interested, is going from bad to better rather than from bad to 
worse according to some human values or human valua­
tions. It is more accurate to speak of valuation as a process 
rather than of values as things, though preference-orderings 
may exist in some corresponding structure of the brain. The 
valuation of large total systems is a difficult process. Agree­
ing about these valuations or orderings is even more dif­
ficult. Nevertheless, it cannot be impossible because we do 
it. And anything that exists must be possible. 
If large systems are to be evaluated, they must first be 
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described. This involves first breaking them down into a 
number of subsets, each of which is reasonably homogene­
ous, so that "when you have seen one member of it, you have 
seen them all," in the deathless phrase of then Governor 
Reagan. Next we have to be able to assign to each unit of each 
subset a valuation coefficient, what economists sometimes 
call a "shadow price," that will reduce each of the subsets to 
some common measure of value. We are familiar with this 
process, of course, when the measure of value is money, as, 
for instance, when we evaluate the physical items on the 
balance sheet. The same principle, however, applies to all 
valuations even though in complex cases the measure of 
value itself may be almost subconscious and the valuation 
coefficients quite fuzzy. If we are to evaluate the large and 
complex systems, however, we must have some system of 
weighting by which the various parts are compared. 
Finally, if we are to evaluate changes in the system, and 
especially changes in parts of it, we must have some image of 
the interrelationship of the parts. We may, for instance, have 
a positive evaluation of a rise in part A; but if a rise in part A 
necessitates a rise in part B (to which we give a negative 
evaluation) or a fall in part C (to which we give a positive 
evaluation), the net change in our evaluation may be very 
different from our evaluation of a simple change in part A. If 
the valuation coefficient for any part is positive, we can say 
that it is a "good"; if it is negative, we can say that it is "bad." 
In the over-all evaluation, a gross change or increase in a 
good may be offset, or even more than offset, by associated 
changes involving an increase in bads or a diminution in 
other goods. This is essentially the problem of "trade-offs," 
which constantly plagues evaluations of large systems. 
A very common source of error in the evaluation of large 
systems (error in the sense that when it is called to people's 
attention they will sometimes admit it) is to take some single 
element or subset in the system and assume that any change 
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in this is an index of the value of the total. Thus, an 
economist might take the GNP or the GNP per capita as an 
index of the value of the system and assume that every time 
this went up things got better, and every time it went down 
things got worse. An imperialist might take the area of an 
empire as such an index, a Communist the amount of prop­
erty in public ownership, a missionary the number of people 
who have converted or the proportion of people belonging to 
his particular faith, a corporation executive the profit of the 
corporation, a professor the length of his bibliography, and 
so on. 
F,g. 1 
This leads into several kinds of error. The first is a failure 
to recognize that the valuation coefficient attached to any 
particular item in a large system is itself usually a function of 
the number of these items. The "goodness curve" SML (fig. 
1) shown along OG, how "good" is each quantity of some 
particular subset of the universe measured along OA ("any­
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thing"), often tends to be a parabolic type of function. This 
follows the great principle of the law of diminishing margi­
nal utility, with its corollary, the principle of the Aristote­
lian mean. Where there is a small amount of anything, as at 
S, the valuation coefficient will be high and an increase of it 
will be good. As the quantity of anything increases, how­
ever, the valuation coefficient tends to fall and the marginal 
valuation coefficient, that is, the increase in the total value of 
the whole system that results from a unit increase of the good 
in question, may fall to zero at the Aristotelian mean, that is, 
the point M at which the contribution of the particular "any­
thing" in question to the total value is a maximum. Beyond 
this point, the valuation coefficient may become negative, so 
that an increase of the quantity of the item actually makes 
things worse rather than better, so that the thing becomes a 
bad rather than a good. * This seems to be an almost universal 
principle, and one of the major errors in the evaluation of 
large systems is the assumption of linearity in valuation 
coefficients. One is sometimes tempted to think that linear 
relationships are a figment of the mathematician's imagina­
tion and that they are virtually unknown in the real world. I 
can hardly resist quoting a verse, which I wrote in a slightly 
different context, that illustrates the point: 
One principle that is an ecological upsetter 
Is that if anything is good, then more of it is better. 
This particular relation gets us very, very wrong, 
For no relation in the world is linear for long. 
The second source of error is the failure to recognize 
trade-offs, that is, changes in variables elsewhere in the 
system that result from an increase or decrease in what we 
might call the "index variable." Thus, an increase in the 
GNP per capita may go along with increased pollution, en­
vironmental decay, social disorder, war preparations, and a 
decline in the capacity to enjoy life, producing what Sci­
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tovsky has called a "joyless economy." Or it may be accom­
panied by greater inequalities of income and even a decline 
in the real income of the poor. 
A particularly nagging and difficult problem is what 
might be called the "invisible trade-offs," the things that are 
not done or not produced as a result of sins of omission. It is 
extraordinarily hard to detect what people did not do that 
they should have done and, as Ogden Nash has pointed out 
in a classic poem, the sins of omission are remarkably little 
fun. Nevertheless, in total evaluation of the system they may 
be very important, because by getting rid of some bads we 
may at the same time get rid of some goods. 
A third source of failure in the evaluation of the total 
system is the failure to look at it from a sufficiently dynamic 
point of view. Any total system exists in time as well as in 
space, and if it is to be evaluated properly, we must evaluate 
it in a time perspective. The system that we evaluate in a 
static sense, as it exists at the moment as good but getting 
worse, is very different from a system that we evaluate in the 
static sense as bad but getting better. Ideally, every system 
should be evaluated in its totality from its beginning to its 
end, but this is usually impossible. In the case of the indi­
vidual human being there is the old adage that one should 
call no man happy until he is dead—nor any enterprise 
successful until it is liquidated. 
This problem crops up, for instance, in evaluating the 
distribution of income. Most observers will probably have 
the usual parabolic evaluation or goodness function here, 
with perfect equality and high inequality rated "low" and 
some intermediate level of inequality as a maximum value. 
The distribution of income, however, looks very different if 
we look at it over the whole life cycle from the way it looked 
at a single point in time. We could, for instance, have a 
society in which all young people were poor and all old 
people rich; then everybody would have exactly equal in­
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comes over their whole life, but at any one time there would 
be sharp inequality between the poor young and the rich old. 
The evaluation of economic development raises the same 
kind of problem: To what extent are we justified in penaliz­
ing the present generation for the benefit of their great-
grandchildren? What have the great-grandchildren done to 
deserve this? Similarly, if the present generation lives it up 
and dissipates natural resources to the detriment of the 
great-grandchildren, who, again, shall say who was most 
deserving? Perfect equality of human beings over time could 
only be achieved if there were no economic development at 
all and the human race existed forever in stagnant poverty. 
This question is very real in the evaluation even of present-
day societies, as, for instance, in the trade-off between de­
velopment and redistribution, which may be real, although 
with better management it might be avoided, or at least made 
less acute. 
American agricultural policy of the last forty years is a 
good case in point. It has been justified politically mainly on 
the basis of redistribution and equity, on the grounds that 
farmers were poorer than the rest of the society and hence 
should be supported. The way in which the policy was 
carried out, however, through price supports and even the 
public support of agricultural research and education, has 
benefited the rich farmers much more than the poor and has 
driven most of the poor farmers out of agriculture altogether, 
with some of them, no doubt, better off and some of them 
worse off. It has also created a spectacular increase in ag­
ricultural productivity, at least in terms of labor, to the point 
where we can now produce all the food we need and a 
surplus for export with less than 4 percent of our labor force. 
On this ground our agricultural policy has made us all 
richer, or at least has greatly improved the chances of any 
individual in this society of getting richer. 
The same problem of evaluation over time applies to what 
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might be called "temporary solutions," solutions to im­
mediate problems that may improve things for a while but 
that may make things worse in the end. A possibly classic 
example of this was Prohibition in the United States. Al­
coholism was recognized as a very serious social problem, 
and the consumption of alcohol was identified by many as a 
nutritional waste. The political solution was Prohibition, 
remarkable because the upper class certainly never wanted 
it and it was passed as a grass-roots, democratic impulse. In 
the twelve years of Prohibition, alcoholism certainly di­
minished, as evidenced by the statistics of deaths from cir­
rhosis of the liver; but it also increased the amount of crime, 
at least of a specialized kind, and it undoubtedly destroyed a 
lot of simple pleasure in the moderate comsumption of al­
coholic beverages by nonalcoholics, which seems to do very 
little harm indeed. At any rate, the ultimate decision was 
made to abandon the "noble experiment," and now al­
coholism is probably worse than it ever was and creates an 
enormous amount of human misery. This is a good example 
of the way in which the value weights that are attached to 
different parts of the system can shift over the course of time. 
And this, of course, introduces another complication into 
the measurement of the change in over-all values of the 
system, somewhat comparable to the problem we face in 
economics in measuring the price level or the GNP, where 
the commodity mix and the relative price structure con­
stantly shifts and constantly changes as new commodities 
are added and old commodities disappear from sight. It is 
very hard to know how to allow for the price or output of a 
color television set in 1900. 
Progress is what happens when the total system that we 
regard as relevant to the human race is getting better over 
time rather than getting worse, according to some process of 
human valuation, whether this is in the mind of a single 
individual or a collective valuation reached through some 
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political process or process of consensus. The measurement 
of over-all progress is extremely difficult because of the 
complexity of the system and the large number of valuation 
coefficients that have to be estimated; but the concept is 
clearly meaningful, and under some circumstances reason­
able consensus can be obtained, at least about the direction 
of progress if not as to its exact magnitude. We do have at 
least imperfect measures for part of the system, like the gross 
national product or the measure of economic welfare (MEW) 
devised by Professors Tobin and Nordhaus2. Everybody rec­
ognizes that these measures are imperfect even within the 
narrow framework of economics, and of course they are 
extremely imperfect in regard to the larger system. 
Progress in the development of better measures of prog­
ress, however, is by no means impossible. We can improve 
the definition of the larger system. Then we can get in­
creased knowledge about the trade-offs that are involved. 
Techniques are developing, such as Kenneth Hammond's 
computer graphics techniques,3 by which the value weight 
of persons can be estimated, even where they are not explicit 
to the persons themselves, simply by analyzing their actual 
choices. It is much harder to measure political progress than 
it is economic progress. It is still more difficult to measure 
religious or moral progress, or progress in justice, particu­
larly when we try to apply these concepts to large systems as 
a whole. It is fairly easy to rank the societies of the world in 
the order of their GNP per capita, whatever that may mean. It 
would be difficult to rank them in the order of the justice of 
the society. 
The Rawls criterion is of great interest here. We ask our­
selves the question, Which society would you rather live in 
if you did not know who you were going to be in it ? This is at 
least an interesting intellectual experiment, and it offers 
perhaps some hope of elucidating the tantilizing trade-off 
between per capita real income on the one hand and its 
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distribution on the other. Would you rather live in a per­
fectly egalitarian society in which there is no chance of 
being rich but also no chance of being desperately poor, or 
would you rather live in a society in which there is some 
chance of being rich and in which there is variety? One 
suspects that an inegalitarian society with a social minimum 
income guaranteed by public grants, in which there was 
some chance of being rich but no chance of being really poor, 
would win the ballot. Movement toward this would then be 
measured as progress. 
Violence and conflict are another interesting dimension of 
society for which we certainly have some over-all values. My 
belief in progress in this regard was greatly reinforced when 
I happened to see Macbeth in the middle of the Watergate 
episode. It occurred to me that Macbeth was Watergate a 
thousand years earlier and a thousand years bloodier and 
that there really had been political progress in that thousand 
years, in terms of our capacity to resolve conflict peacefully. 
In the twentieth century war certainly does not seem to be 
worth what it costs, and most people would agree that Leba­
non has gone from bad to worse in the last three years and 
that a movement toward peace would be progress. Lewis 
Richardson's Statistics of Deadly Quarrels4 was a first step 
toward the quantification of this cluster in the over-all total 
system. The movement toward peace however, is much 
more difficult than the measure of it. 
The movement to develop social indicators, which has 
achieved some momentum in the United States in the last 
few years, is in part an attempt to widen the measurement of 
progress. Many of the separate indicators, for instance, of 
crime, fear in the streets, divorce, health, discrimination, 
and so on, are useful and illuminating. In the absence of any 
agreed system of valuation weights, however, we have not 
come up with any general over-all measure of progress out­
side the narrowly economic sphere. I am convinced, how­
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ever, that this is one area where progress can still be made. 
Even when the problem of the measure of progress has 
been solved, however, the problem of why things so often 
seem to go from bad to worse rather than from bad to better 
still remains. Even without an exact measure of progress, 
processes that produce "perverse dynamics," that make 
things go from bad to worse in spite of the fact that indi­
vidual decisions are always thought to be for the best at the 
time, can be identified. Such are prisoners' dilemmas, 
tragedies of the commons, externalities in economics, popu­
lation explosions, arms races, tyrannies, mental disease, and 
so on. These can be recognized, and occasionally cured, 
without accurate measures of progress. But the more accu­
rate the measure, the better chance we have, one hopes, of 
identifying these perverse dynamic processes and perhaps 
of developing social cybernetic mechanisms that will catch 
them and reverse them before they do all the harm of which 
they are capable. 
Our attitude toward progress itself can follow a "goodness 
curve." On the one hand is a snarling cynicism that denies 
all validity to progress; on the other is a Pollyannaish op­
timism that sees all cities turning inevitably into tearless 
alabaster. Somewhere between these extremes is a sober but 
cheerful realism that sees betterment as both perceivable 
and attainable, even if only very roughly measurable. 
Whether there are ultimate limits to progress we cannot say, 
any more than we can predict the future of evolution. All 
potential for betterment is exhausted as progress is realized, 
but new potential can continually be created. Human history 
is a constant seesaw of exhaustion and creation of potential, 
and the creation cannot be predicted. 
The history of the United States can be written in terms of 
the realization of a certain potential, and perhaps a failure to 
realize others. On the whole, however, realization has 
dominated. The filling-up of a large new niche of developed 
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society; the proclamation of ideals of "liberty and justice for 
all" that begin with hypocrisy ("liberty and justice for 
some") but constantly come under pressure for realization. 
Even the original potential is by no means realized; we have 
a long way still to go, but it would be self-depreciation 
beyond the call of duty to deny that some of it has been 
realized. I am a naturalized American, perhaps with some of 
the naive enthusiasm of the convert, and I felt when I ac­
cepted citizenship that I took on a real burden of collective 
guilt—for the arrogance, militarism, racism, carelessness of 
this big and bouncy society. But I also felt the potential, both 
the realized and the yet-to-be realized, with which I wanted 
to be identified, and I have never regretted becoming an 
American, even though my deepest loyalty is to the human 
race and beyond. That potential is still there to be realized, 
and what is more, new potential is waiting to be created. In 
some ways we are reaching the end of some of the old 
potential. The continent is full, we are not going to get much 
richer, we are moving toward a more integrated society with 
fewer people excluded from its benefits and responsibilities. 
Our next step is to create a new potential, a vision of our 
mission in the larger world. In our rush toward being a world 
power, indeed the world power, we have lost sight of the 
"goodness" that alone justifies power, and we do not really 
know how to use that power. Our relative power is diminish­
ing, and will continue to diminish, though in absolute terms 
our power will continue to be large. Unless we "stand for" 
something in the world, however, that power will lose 
legitimacy and will eventually disappear. 
1. This seems to be a better distinction between "goods" and "bads" than 
the distinction between positions below the line OA and positions above 
OA in figure 1. Below OA absolute goodness is negative; this would suggest 
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suicide rather than a mere "bad." Most goodness curves probably start at a 
positive level, like S'ML'. They likewise may never reach absolute negative 
goodness, again like S'ML'. 
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Michael Kammen 
From Scarcity to Abundance—to 
Scarcity? Some Implications for 
the American Tradition From 
the Perspective of a Cultural 
Historian 
American folk culture has often provided us with some 
interesting responses and clues to the national mood. 
Whether it has consistently provided us with an accurate 
reflection of national realities, however, is another matter. 
Therefore, within the framework of our mutual theme— 
abundance, scarcity, and the American tradition—I want to 
explore some aspects of this peculiar relationship between 
perception and reality. It may very well be, for example, that 
our course has really not run from abundance to scarcity, but 
more nearly the other way around. Equally plausible, 
perhaps our path has been from scarcity to abundance, and 
now back to scarcity once again (at least in some respects). 
More on these alternatives anon.1 
One classic artifact of American folk culture is the woolen 
coverlet. Those pioneers who spilled into the Ohio Valley 
during the 1820s and 1830s brought their coverlets from 
older homesteads, and then wove new ones as the heirlooms 
wore out. One of the favorite designs for these coverlets was 
called the "Peace and Plenty" pattern, popular because it 
expressed so well the settlers' aspirations.2 That theme of 
peace and plenty was a dominant one in American culture 
from the time of Thomas Jefferson until the age of Lincoln.3 
Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, recognized that 
Washington's "Farewell Address" of 1797 set the tone in so 
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many ways for American thought during the nineteenth 
century; and Tocqueville selected this particular sentence 
for emphasis in his discussion of the "Farewell Address." 
Washington had asked, "Why, by interweaving our destiny 
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and 
prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, in­
terest, humor, or caprice?"4 
Tocqueville went on to develop, as a major motif in his 
book, the social and political implications of prosperity for 
the American tradition. He argued with strong conviction 
that "general prosperity favors stability in all governments, 
but particularly in a democratic one, for it [democratic gov­
ernment] depends on the moods of the greatest number, and 
especially on the moods of those most exposed to want." He 
believed that the physical sources of abundance conducive 
to prosperity were "more numerous in America than in any 
other country at any other time in history." Therefore, he 
contended, "one must go to America to understand the 
power of material prosperity over political behavior." Toc­
queville then concluded that "the American has always seen 
order and public prosperity linked together and marching in 
step; it never strikes him that they could be separate."5 
For the most part, Tocqueville seems to have regarded 
prosperity as being both beneficial and a major source of 
cohesion in American society. As he remarked in a chapter 
entitled "Spirit of the Township in New England," "With 
profound peace and material prosperity prevailing in 
America, there are few storms in municipal life."6 Only on 
occasion did he look upon the darker side, as when he 
observed that "the greatest danger threatening the United 
States springs from its very prosperity," because in some of 
the states "it brings the intoxication which goes with sudden 
access of fortune, and in others it brings the envy, distrust, 
and regrets which most often follow where it is lost." Sub­
sequently he remarked that after 1800 prosperity "made men 
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forget the cause that had produced it, and with the danger 
passed, the Americans could no longer summon the energy 
or the patriotism which had enabled them to get rid of it [i.e., 
British hegemony]." Consequently, he concluded, "The 
peace and order brought about by the federal government 
led to its own decline."7 That last, needless to say, is a 
perception circumscribed by the particular circumstances of 
the early 1830s. 
For the most part, however, Tocqueville and his 
contemporaries—native as well as foreign—were impressed 
by our abundance and therefore considered its proper dis­
tribution to be one of the normative and primary respon­
sibilities of government. (Commenting upon the American 
diet in 1817, William Cobbett quipped that "you are not 
much pressed to eat and drink, but such an abundance is 
spread before you that you instantly lose all re­
straint."8 Twenty years later, in writing his famous decision 
on the Charles River Bridge case, Chief Justice Roger B. 
Taney declared that "the object and end of all government is 
to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community 
by which it is established."9 Only in a society where freedom 
and security might be taken for granted could the ranking 
judicial spokesman insist that government existed to facili­
tate the achievement of happiness and wealth! The 
populace, moreover, agreed with him. Samuel G. Goodrich 
scored a stunning popular success with his children's books, 
such as Peter Parley's Common SchooJ History. And in the 
1845 edition, for example, millions of Americans nodded 
their approval to the following: 
If you are fond of travelling, cross Lake Erie in a steamboat, and 
proceed to Ohio. See there a country that has not been settled 
fifty years, now studded over with thriving towns and vil­
lages. Consider the great valley through which the Mis­
sissippi flows; the millions of people that are already there; the 
rapid increase of wealth, the progress of refinement, and the 
multiplication of the inhabitants.10 
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And yet, even while Justice Taney wrote his decision, and 
before Peter Parley told the children that their land flowed 
with milk and honey, a few voices offered warnings that 
Nature's abundance might not always be the handmaiden of 
Civilization's advance. Henry David Thoreau is perhaps the 
best known among those early prophets of scarcity; but there 
was also Thomas Cole, the popular and romantic artist, 
whose series of paintings entitled "The Course of Empire" 
sounded an allegorical alarm wherever they were exhibited 
during the later 1830s. And there were social critics like the 
author of a review in the Literary World for 1847, who 
complained that 
the axe of civilization is busy with our old forests, and artisan 
ingenuity is fast sweeping away the relics of our national in­
fancy. . . . Our inland lakes, once sheltered and secluded in 
the midst of noble forests, are now laid bare and covered with 
busy craft; and even the primordial hills, once bristling with 
shaggy pine . . . are being shorn of their locks, and left to 
blister in cold nakedness in the sun. 
Although saddened by the speed with which we con­
sumed our natural resources, these authors were half a cen­
tury ahead of their time; and more than a century would pass 
before popular opinion could be aroused to the genuine risks 
inherent in our rapacious growth. The Knickerbocker 
magazine put it quite simply in 1838: "Nature has been 
penetrated in her wildest recesses, and made to yield her 
hidden stores."11 
Only in the 1880s and 1890s, however, did a significant 
number of Americans begin to realize that, as Willard Hurst 
has stated, "exhaustion or scarcity was not impossible, even 
in the midst of our opportunities." For much of the 
nineteenth century, in fact, the underlying assumptions 
held by many had been quite the opposite, namely, that their 
capital, technology, and especially their labor supply were 
barely adequate to the abundant challenges of the North 
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American environment. They suffered, as Professor Hurst 
has written, from a "scarcity of means relative to oppor­
tunities."12 
By the close of the nineteenth century there were articu­
late critics who wondered whether our prosperity inevitably 
had to be accompanied by the growth of poverty. "This 
association of poverty with progress," said Henry George, 
"is the great enigma of our times. . .  . So long as all the 
increased wealth which modern progress brings goes but to 
build up great fortunes, to increase luxury and make sharper 
the contrast between the House of Have and the House of 
Want, progress is not real and cannot be permanent."13 
During the 1890s many Americans became especially 
aware that land, which for centuries had been our most 
abundant resource, was getting to be in comparatively short 
supply. Hence the stimulus and occasion for Frederick 
Jackson Turner's famous essay "The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History" (1893). Hence the origins of 
our extraordinary conservation movement, which blos­
somed under Theodore Roosevelt's influential leadership. 
Hence the withdrawal of certain public lands from access to 
commercial development early in this century. And hence 
the search by some to replenish our resources by means of 
new frontiers overseas. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century into the twentieth, a 
brilliant cluster of critics emerged who offered a variety of 
penetrating responses to the problem of scarcity amidst 
abundance. I have already mentioned one of them, Henry 
George; but his voice was joined by those of Henry Demarest 
Lloyd, Edward Bellamy, Thorstein Veblen, Richard Ely, 
Algie M. Simons, and Simon Patten. It was Patten, for in­
stance, who observed, in 1907, that an economy of scarcity 
offered one sort of role for the ordinary man, whereas an 
economy characterized by abundance offered him quite a 
different on.14 
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What these economists and social theorists began to dis­
cuss at that time, we in turn must expand upon now: namely, 
the realization that critical commodities once abundant be­
come scarce, and vice versa! Our labor force, which was so 
sparse in the colonial period, now seems to be considerably 
larger than our capacity to deploy judiciously. Our agricul­
tural productivity has gone from basic self-sufficiency 
three-hundred years ago to being a breadbasket for the 
world. Our knowledge and mastery of the environment have 
undergone an extraordinary inversion since the perilous, 
groping explorations of Lewis and Clark. Our technological 
skills and the related service industries have proliferated 
since 1850. Our business corporations and educational in­
stitutions have progressed from being negligible in the age 
of Jefferson to being vast in this age of aggregation. Our 
communication capacity has been utterly transformed from 
sluggish to instantaneous because of airplanes, highways, 
television, and space satellites. We now have a surfeit of 
information where once it was scarce. And finally, our 
search for security—in the broadest sense—has resulted in a 
marked transformation, from minimal to almost stultifying: 
on account of fire, accident, and life insurance; health care; 
social security benefits; police protection; and welfare pay­
ments. Over the centuries we have progressed from a pro­
nounced absence of security for our persons and property to 
an incredible panoply of programs and policies designed to 
minimize risk or uncertainty in our lives. Abundance has 
helped to make that transformation possible. 
If in recent years we have moved from abundance to scar­
city in some respects (e.g., steel, aluminum, copper, glass, 
fiberboard for boxes, tinplate for cans, soda ash for bleach, 
paper for newsprint, sugar, both non-petroleum and pet­
rochemicals), and if we have had progress accompanied by 
poverty in others, the full story is still more complicated 
because, in terms of our broadest contours (going all the way 
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back to 1607), we have really moved from profound scar­
cities to abundance; and just recently, with regard to energy, 
food, and economic growth, to apparent shortages once 
again. I want to provide some specificity here because the 
nature and extent of scarcity during the first half of Ameri­
can history tends to be too readily overlooked. If we really 
wish to appreciate the implications for American tradition 
of our contemporary shift from abundance to scarcity, then 
we must look at the impact in earlier times of the transition 
from scarcity to abundance.15 
David M. Potter, for example, in the most profound book 
ever written about American abundance and its attitudinal 
consequences, noted that abundance exacted a heavy 
psychological penalty for the physical gains that it confer­
red. What did Potter have in mind? He was thinking about 
the workman's identification with his work and the satisfac­
tions he derived from it. 
However humble his position, the craftsman knew that his 
community, with its economy of scarcity, needed his work, and, 
since it was his own work in the craft sense, he could regard his 
product as an extension of himself. The age of abundance, how­
ever, requiring a greater volume of processed goods, utilized
machinery to meet the demand and made the former craftsman a 
more productive but less creative and less essential attendant
upon the machine.16 
Let us at least mention, therefore, some of the most basic 
patterns of scarcity during the first three centuries of Ameri­
can experience—the three centuries prior to our own—in 
order to deepen our perspective upon ways in which re­
sources (or the perception of inadequate resources) have 
shaped our national traditions. The most fundamental insuf­
ficiencies, cited roughly in the order of their chronological 
emergence, were labor, capital, manufactured goods, land in 
the older sections of the country (such as New England), 
water in the plains and western portions, bullion for specie, 
and, most recently, energy. 
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Labor was in very short supply during the seventeenth 
century and well into the eighteenth, so much so that En­
glish mercantilists studied the situation in Ireland for clues 
to figuring out the colonial economy in North America. Thus 
William Temple's discussion of Ireland in 1673, "where, by 
the largeness and plenty of the Soil, and scarcity of People, 
all things necessary to Life are so cheap, that an industrious 
Man, by two days labour, may gain enough to feed him the 
rest of the week."17 Thus the view propounded by advocates 
of colonization: that transporting more laborers to the New 
World would increase its productivity many times over, 
whereas the surfeit of labor in England only augmented 
poverty for so many persons there. Here is a characteristic 
statement from Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Geor­
gia, a promotional tract printed in 1733. Its claims are more 
visionary than descriptive. The author urged the hypotheti­
cal "man of benevolence" to 
think himself in a visit to Georgia. Let him see those, who are
now a prey to all the calamities of want living under a 
sober and orderly government, settled in towns, which are aris­
ing at distances along navigable rivers . the whole face of 
the country changed by agriculture, and plenty in every part of 
it. Let him see the people all in employment of various kinds,
women and children feeding and nursing the silk worms, wind­
ing off the silk, or gathering the olives; the men ploughing and
planting their lands, tending their cattle, or felling the forest.18 
Scarcity of labor in early America had all sorts of profound 
implications for the American tradition: encouragement of 
immigration (including even political and religious dissen­
ters, not to mention convicts); rapid physical and social 
mobility whereby indentured servants soon became mas­
ters, or ambitious artisan masters became merchants; and, 
eventually, the application of technological ingenuity un­
leashed by the search for labor-saving devices. As H. }. 
Habakkuk has observed, 
Americans from early times were often faced with a situation 
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where a job had to be done—a house built or a river bridged— 
with the labour available on the spot, because the place was 
isolated and it was impossible to attract more labour. This gave 
them an enormous incentive to use their labour to most advan­
tage, to make use of mechanical aids where this was possible, 
but in any case to organise the labour most effective­
ly . . .  . The shortage of labour led generally to longer hours 
of work, to a general emphasis on the saving of time and a sense 
of urgency about getting the job done.19 
During the troubled prelude to our Revolution, one tactic 
used by the patriots to pressure Parliament into reversing 
invidious policies was the non-importation movement, or 
boycott of British products. Doing so caused the colonists to 
consider the whole matter of their achieving self-
sufficiency, and therefore to reflect upon the vast potential 
of America's abundant resources. Whig writers declared that 
the colonies comprised "the American Canaan," where men 
could "eat Bread without Scarceness, and . . . lack no­
thing." In fact, the inhabitants of such a land should be 
"ashamed to be dependent on other Countries for Manufac­
tures."20 
During the Revolutionary period, problems of scarcity 
became very serious for many American communities, espe­
cially in New England. A classic town such as Concord, 
Massachusetts, had begun to suffer privation even before the 
historic shots rang out in April of 1775. A new (and sophisti­
cated) town history of Concord tells us that "on the eve of the 
Revolution, Concord was a declining town facing a grim 
future of increasing poverty, economic stagnation, and even 
depopulation, a future that jeopardized the heretofore 
peaceful relations between social classes." Land had been 
subdivided so often that some farms were really too small to 
be economically efficient as units of production. In the ab­
sence of scientific agriculture, moreover, the land was wear­
ing out and property values were declining. Crop yields 
dropped off and forced farmers to plough up their marginal 
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lands. For a time it became more profitable simply to clear 
woodlands and sell lumber for shipbuilding or firewood, 
even as charcoal or potash (the major ingredient in soapmak­
ing) at the Boston market. Imprisonment for debt became 
common in 1774 and 1775. As purchasing capacity dwin­
dled, shopkeepers found that they had overstocked inven­
tories. Vagabonds tramped through the town, and young 
people left to seek their livelihoods elsewhere.21 
When some of these folks returned following the War for 
Independence, by the way, they had to exercise their in­
genuity in order to cope with changing patterns of scarcity 
and availability. If you visit the famous Old Manse in Con­
cord, for example, where Ralph Waldo Emerson and 
Nathaniel Hawthorne later lived, you will find in the dining 
room a charming chest-on-chest which seems a bit peculiar 
in the color and texture of its wood. Joseph Hosmer, a local 
cabinetmaker, made the top from cherry wood in 1775. Then 
he departed to serve in the War; and when he returned in 
1780, there were no cherry trees left in the locale. So he 
completed the piece by making the bottom half from rock 
maple! 
The pattern of depletion in Revolutionary Concord was 
repeated many times over in rural America during the 
nineteenth century. One classic memoir, written about the 
1830s and 1840s in upstate New York, recalls that the Con­
klin family farm 
was in a narrow valley running east and west perhaps thirty or
forty rods wide. This was good rich tillable land and partly
cleared. . . . On the south side of the valley was a very steep
hill covered with forest growth running the whole length of the 
farm. This too was good land but a terrible place to get crops off 
of. On the north side of the valley was a sloping side hill. . .and 
here was our coasting ground in winter with our hand sleds. But 
this side hill was very poor land. The soil was a sort of clay and it 
was mostly barren with the exceptions of a few second growth 
pine, oak bushes, sweet ferns and huckleberry bushes, and up in 
here were the rattlesnakes. 
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This family lived close to nature and even closer to the 
margin of subsistence, As Henry Conklin recalled in 1891, 
"How we enjoyed the dried fruit in the cold winters when 
other luxuries were scarce."22 
Precisely because of these scarcities in New England and 
upstate New York, settlers moved on rapidly to the Old 
Northwest, where they found and fostered the good earth. In 
Indiana, Rachel Peden writes, 
we have at least nine seasons in an average year, built around an 
average annual growing season of 188 days. To move away from
this abundance to a place that has only four seasons is like
moving out of the big, rambling farmhouse you were born in to a 
small city apartment.23 
Mrs. Peden has been a wise farmwife for almost half a 
century, and some of her insights into rural life penetrate to 
the very core of our American experience with scarcity and 
abundance. "What makes the vinegar bee like humans," she 
notes, "is that the individual adapts itself to the environ­
ment and, where the living is easy, makes no effort to de­
velop its own resourcefulness."24 That homely wisdom 
echoes what critics said constantly about American farming 
for almost two centuries after the time of Robert Beverley's 
History and Present State of Virginia in 1705; namely, that 
our productive promise was not matched by our ac­
complishments, and that we suffered from scarcity and de­
privation despite our rich resources. Here is just one illustra­
tion, drawn from the American Magazine and Monthly 
Chronicle for February 1758: 
The inhabitants [i.e., immigrants] who were confined to narrow 
farms in their native country, are many of them, insatiable in
their desires after lands, and rather waste and impoverish, than
improve them. Many have acquired a roving unsettled temper,
and are grown impatient of labor andfrugal industry; and hav­
ing abused their farms, sell them, and move back to purchase
new lands on the borders of the Indian nations.25 
There has been a great transformation in this regard dur­
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ing the twentieth century, of course, due especially to 
phenomenal success with fertilizers. Between 1949 and 
1968, for example, our harvested acreage declined by 16 
percent, but our yield per acre increased by 77 percent.26 As 
agriculture becomes increasingly mechanized, fewer and 
fewer people are required to grow and harvest more and 
more produce. One consequence is that the official defini­
tion of what constitutes a farm was changed in 1975. For 
years government statisticians had classified as a farm "any 
place under 10 acres with annual sales of $250 or more of 
agricultural goods, or any place of 10 acres or more selling 
$50 or more." Hereafter the Agriculture Department will 
only count as farms those places that normally sell $1,000 or 
more worth of farm products per year—a reclassification 
that will simply eliminate some 16 to 20 percent of the 2.8 
million farms listed in 1975 government records as being 
operational. By deleting smallness and recognizing only 
bigness and high productivity, we will artificially alter our 
perception of the average American farm. With hundreds of 
thousands of low-income farms eliminated from the statis­
tics, an apparent increase in per-farm productivity will be 
recorded.27 
Even more serious, in terms of its implications for Ameri­
can tradition, is the fact that our genuine growth in produc­
tivity has occurred at the cost of terrible ecological damage. 
As Barry Commoner has pointed out, for example, between 
1949 and 1968 our crop production increased 6 percent per 
capita, while the annual use of fertilizer nitrogen grew by 
648 percent. The danger from such an abundance of nitrite 
in our soil is quite simply that it poisons our water supply.28 
What is to be done about dilemmas such as these? What 
are the implications for American tradition of our histori­
cally changing configurations of scarcity and abundance? 
One major answer, I believe, however much it may run 
contrary to our present mood,29 is to bring the power of 
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government to bear in a positive way upon our problems. We 
have, in fact, a long-standing tradition of governmental reg­
ulation in response to issues of scarcity and abundance. 
During the early nineteenth century, as David Potter ob­
served, 
The major form in which abundance presented itself was the 
fertility of unsettled land. For a people of whom 90 percent 
followed agricultural pursuits, access to abundance meant op­
portunity to settle the new lands. The government responded by 
a series of land laws, beginning with the ordinance of 1785 and 
extending far past the Homestead Act of 1862, which made land 
progressively easier for settlers to attain, until at last they could 
acquire title to 160 acres absolutely free.30 
The point that I wish to make most emphatically is that if 
the government could actively intervene to help distribute 
our abundance during the nineteenth century, then it ought 
to intervene in order to help control scarcities in the late 
twentieth century (by taxing wealth, for example, rather 
than strictly income). During the first half of this republic's 
history we suffered from a genuine scarcity of capital for 
economic development; and so, as Willard Hurst discovered 
from examining the laws passed by our state legislatures in 
the nineteenth century, "a lively and pervasive sense of 
capital scarcity, relative to our opportunities, supplied the 
dynamic of public policy." Acquiring the privilege of li­
mited liability was sought as a positive aid by law to the 
recruitment of capital.31 
Law responded to the pervasive sense of capital scarcity chiefly 
by affecting the allocation of economic resources Law 
guaranteed and protected individuals and groups in their pri­
vate planning and execution, and where it brought its force to 
bear it was to extend the reach of private will by lending it legal 
power to enforce its decisions and fulfill its expectations 
We also used the compulsion of law directly to affect the 
allocation of resources; government took the responsibility of 
channelling the flow of assets in some key areas of the economy 
and employed a variety of compulsions to this end.32 
50 From Scarcity to Abundance-to Scarcity? 
So it was that public policy responded to our abundance of 
land, timber, minerals, and waterpower. So it happened that 
legislation and the rise of banking helped to provide means 
of exchange, facilities for the mobilization of capital, oppor­
tunities for long-term investment and accommodations for 
the short-term needs of trade and seasonal agriculture. Simi­
larly, when specie or bullion was found to be in short sup­
ply, our colonial legislatures intervened to produce paper 
money; and later the federal government turned to a bimetal­
lic currency basis in order to relieve the shortage of gold.33 
At the beginning of this century, it became apparent to 
many Americans that our natural resources were seriously 
in jeopardy. They had been gobbled with particular voracity 
during the period 1870-1900, and they were being seized by 
special interests of all sorts, So Theodore Roosevelt brought 
his leadership and influence to the assistance of the conser­
vation movement. More concretely, he used his presidential 
powers to triple the areas set aside as national forests and 
transferred them to the Department of Agriculture, where 
they were safe from commercial developers. He also with­
drew large areas of mineral lands from availability to the 
private sector, kept water power sites under federal control, 
and required livestockmen to pay fees for use of the range 
and to provide funds for the protection and improvement of 
the public ranges. He prevailed upon Congress, moreover, to 
provide for the sale of mature stumpage as well as to use the 
income obtained for better forest management.34 
Teddy Roosevelt's success three-quarters of a century ago 
contains an object lesson for our present problem with di­
minishing resources. The lesson lies, in my opinion, not so 
much in choosing between weak government or big gov­
ernment, but in having concerned government—concerned 
and responsive government—willing to protect that na­
tional interest against the inevitable aggressions of private 
and commercial groups. The role of government must 
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change in response to our best-informed perception of na­
tional needs. As Paul Wallace Gates has pointed out, 
The public lands have come to have different levels of interest
for society as society has matured. At one time the government
was concerned only with revenue and the public mainly with
surface rights to good land for farms. Later it became important
first to develop, then to conserve, the natural resources of the
land in timber, minerals, oil, and water. Nowadays the land as
living space and play space has taken on new values.35 
Americans have had a distinctive (and rather inconsis­
tent) tradition of wanting federal help without federal regu­
lation.36 We have shown a certain parochialism, if not naiv­
ete, about the relationship between ideological rhetoric and 
the realities of political economy. Perhaps there is a smid­
geon of insight in that sardonic folk lexicon which attempts 
to define the spectrum of "isms" in these homely terms: 
Socialism is when you have two cows, you give one to 
your neighbor. 
Capitalism is when you have two cows, you sell one and 
buy a bull. 
Communism is when you have two cows, the government 
takes both and gives you the milk. 
Fascism is when you have two cows, the government takes 
both and sells you the milk. 
Nazism is when you have two cows, the government takes 
both and shoots you. 
New Dealism is when you have two cows, the government 
takes both, shoots one, milks the other, and then throws 
the milk away! 
Ideological labels and "isms" make Americans uneasy be­
cause we have been conditioned for too long to think in 
terms of inflexible, doctrinaire stereotypes. 
What complicates matters, for our purposes here, is that 
scarcity and abundance both have been blamed for giving 
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rise to identical problems and undesirable traditions. To 
Karl Marx, for example, the real source of evil in this world is 
scarcity because scarcity causes the competitive pursuit of 
private advantage.37 Yet Tocqueville attributed the very 
same consequences to excessive prosperity, as I mentioned 
quite early in this essay.38 For whatever it may be worth, I 
should also point out that we have in American thought no 
significant body of literature dealing with scarcity; yet we do 
have a persistent tradition of talking about the "perils of 
prosperity," or, as one clergyman put it in 1785, The Dangers 
of Our National Prosperity.39 We have understandably been 
more willing to cope with the corrosive effects of affluence 
upon our moral fiber than we have been to endure the 
strengthening asceticism of scarcity. Thus Sam Adams's 
vision of the republic as a Christian Sparta following the 
American Revolution came to nought. 
It has been extremely fashionable in this Bicentennial year 
to talk and write about the contradictions of capitalism; and 
that trend is all the more striking because the audible voices 
of criticism belong not only to liberals and moderates but to 
the so-called new conservatives as well as American 
Marxists and socialists.40 So long as their analyses of our 
system are valid and perceptive, we can only benefit from 
such searching probes. It is important to maintain a bit of 
perspective, however, and keep in mind the massive con­
tradicitons that also beset the Soviet system and the Chinese, 
as well as the planned economies of such diverse nations as 
Peru, Yugoslavia, and Iraq.41 
I find it more fruitful to think about solutions—and about 
their implications for the American tradition—in terms of 
proposals and remedies free from ideological labels and 
preconceived categories. Is the notion of a negative income 
tax un-American? Is it "left-wing" or "right-wing"? I do not 
know; but both John Kenneth Galbraith and Milton Fried­
man are for it, so it must not be all bad.42 We really ought to 
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be at least as willing to defy the prevailing conventional 
wisdom as our forefathers were. Back in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, when labor was scarce and land was 
abundant, they used land creatively in order to attract labor 
and to compensate for its shortage (by means of mingled 
livestock grazing on a commons, for example). In the 
eighteenth century, when unanticipated mobility defied the 
accepted notions of social status and order, they adjusted 
their sense of structure and, in the process, inadvertently 
became more egalitarian. During the nineteenth century 
Americans found still other ways to compensate for trouble­
some deficiencies. Raising corn, for instance, was a labor­
saving, land-intensive form of agriculture. In industry, too, 
as H. J. Habakkuk has pointed out, 
the lower rents for sites enabled New Englanders to economise
in labour and capital in the construction of cotton-textile mills
and also to build mills which enabled more effective use to be 
made of the textile workers and textile machines by allowing
them more space. Similarly the American railways were built in 
ways which, in effect, substituted land for capital as contrasted
with the English railways which were built with a disregard for
natural obstacles, a disregard which increased their engineering 
cost.43 
Today our productive capacity seems to have raced ahead of 
commercial needs and consumer demands. Are we suffi­
ciently flexible and resilient to envision new applications of 
our productive capacity for the public good? 
I share President Enarson's belief in the art of planning, 
and I too prefer what he has called the Lewis and Clark 
model, "with its sense of adventure as it explores new fron­
tiers."44 I also believe in the necessity for greater coopera­
tion: between business and government to some degree, but 
even more between various levels of government and be­
tween agencies of government at the same level. Samuel 
Hays has demonstrated the extent to which interdepartmen­
tal squabbling undercut the Progressive conservation 
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movement. The Ballinger-Pinchot controversy of 1909 was 
merely the most famous of those dangerous rivalries.45 
Given the fearful pollution of our environment, which Barry 
Commoner has described in his chapters on "Illinois Earth" 
and "Lake Erie Water," we clearly need much closer cooper­
ation between the Departments of Agriculture and Interior 
plus other pertinent agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation. Or, given the crisis of our inner cities, we must 
have greater co-operation and trust between the Depart­
ments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Housing and 
Urban Development, plus the National League of Cities. 
Then there is the question of technology: how should it be 
utilized to minimize our scarcities, and how can it be used 
without adding to our environmental problems or undercut­
ting the best in our social traditions? We have learned that 
the first American conservation movement experimented with
the application of the new technology to resource management.
Requiring centralized and coordinated decisions, however, this
procedure conflicted with American political institutions
which drew their vitality from filling local needs. This conflict 
between the centralizing tendencies of effective economic or­
ganization and the decentralizing forces inherent in a multitude 
of geographical interests presented problems to challenge even
the wisest statesman.46 
The scientists and conservationists of our Progressive Era 
admired technology and were eager to apply it to all the 
environmental problems they confronted. By contrast, Barry 
Commoner holds uncontrolled technology responsible for 
many of our most serious ecological dilemmas of the past 
thirty years. "The crucial link between pollution and prof­
its," he contends, "appears to be modern technology, which 
is both the main source of recent increases in productiv­
ity . and of recent assaults on the environment."47 Does 
this mean that the new conservation movement of the com­
ing generation will inevitably have to be anti-technological? 
No, at least not entirely. Even Commoner, for instance, envi­
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sions a massive pipeline that would return natural wastes 
from our cities to our farms rather than dumping them into 
lakes, rivers, and oceans. The solution to that important 
problem is going to require some very sophisticated but 
carefully controlled technology.48 
The whole issue of what to do with various kinds of 
so-called waste products now engages the attention of grow­
ing numbers of American scientists. Each year, for example, 
our cities dispose of 125 million tons in solid wastes that, 
according to the Ford Foundation's "Energy Conservation 
Papers," contain, in part, 800,000 tons of aluminum, 10.6 
million tons of ferrous metals, and 400,000 tons of nonferr­
ous metals such as copper. Research scientists are now de­
veloping the technology that may enable us to turn readable 
cellulose (i.e., your daily newspaper) into food and fuel; turn 
fish sawdust as well as the bones and flesh from fish fillets 
into processed food for human consumption; and turn the 
chitin from shrimp, lobster, and crab shells into a polymer 
that will bind and strengthen other chemical structures.49 
If technology can help us convert waste products into 
useful ones, then we will have reshaped the American tradi­
tion in a most important way. Winston Churchill, one of the 
most popular American novelists during the decades before 
World War I, published a best-seller in 1899 entitled Richard 
Carvel. It is all about a young man from Maryland, the 
coming of the Revolution and the character of John Paul 
Jones. In 1771 the hero, Richard Carvel, makes his first visit 
to Scotland, where he proclaims, "Here waste was sin: with 
us part and parcel of a creed." I think that Churchill was 
correct in saying that wastefulness has been an American 
way of life. That must change if we are to cope with the 
scarcities of our time. I believe that it is, very slowly, begin­
ning to change. 
Rachel Peden, the wise Midwestern farmwife whom I 
mentioned earlier, has written that "a farm is a place of 
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opportunity simultaneous with obligation."50It seems to me 
that this is true of the nation as well, except that for most of 
our history we have thought much more in terms of our 
opportunities than of our obligations. We are going to have 
to restore a better balance or sense of proportion between the 
two.sl 
Insofar as we may need to adjust our accustomed standard 
of living by scaling it down somewhat, perhaps the geog­
raphical mobility that has been so characteristic of the 
American style may provide us with an opportunity to meet 
one of our new obligations. "It's not easy to change your 
standard of living where you are," said Alfred A. Knopf 
thirty years ago, "but if you have any inner resources, it's a 
simple matter to adopt a different standard in entirely differ­
ent surroundings."52 It would be rather disorderly, I think, 
if we all upped and moved simultaneously; but it would be 
interesting—and probably a terrific boost for the economy! 
One might assert that the most serious scarcity in our 
time—and one at the very core of that contemporary malaise 
so frequently mentioned—is a scarcity of satis/actions. We 
seem to be a dissatisfied society, and because that is a 
psychic grievance, it may very well be the most difficult of 
our current needs to remedy.53 I feel certain that it has 
something to do with the increased amounts of leisure that 
most Americans now have, because we really do not have a 
tradition of using leisure either wisely or gracefully. Not in a 
society built upon the work ethic. In fact, the very idea of 
leisure was simply anathema to most Americans in the 
nineteenth century.54 
With increased life-spans, a 35-hour week, and remarka­
bly long, paid vacations, many Americans now have an 
abundance of leisure. But I would not say that they enjoy an 
abundance of leisure because that is not yet demonstrably 
true. As we come to explore the impact of leisure upon the 
American tradition, however, we may very well want to 
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redefine what we mean when we allude to "the pursuit of 
happiness." Mrs. Peden points out that 
time is something people take for granted, wish they had more 
of, complain they never have any of for themselves, and waste as 
if they had flowing wells of it in their back yards. Actually what 
makes time scarce or abundant is not so much the hour, as what 
the hour is leading into.55 
Well, the hour is growing late—both for us and, according 
to our leading environmentalists, for a nation that soils its 
own nest. The fulfillment of Utopian visions in the United 
States has long been dependent upon the abundant avail­
ability of special resources. For Roger Williams and William 
Penn that meant new space in the wilderness to provide 
refuge for communitarian settlements. For the Founding 
Fathers in 1776, 1787, or 1800 the special resources were 
political creativity and physical isolation. Seeking to pre­
serve the Union, Abraham Lincoln had industrial and de­
mographic advantages. In the twentieth century T. R. and 
Wilson and F. D. R. had economic leverage and military 
power. 
What are our Utopian visions today? A healthy environ­
ment? Full employment? A high standard of living? Sec­
urity for our persons and property? And what special re­
sources do we have to fulfill them? Technological know­
how; an extraordinary educational system and a high rate of 
literacy; a viable political system; and a free and vigorous 
press. 
It is significant, I believe, that the underpinnings for our 
sense of national character and destiny have changed over 
the centuries. Throughout the colonial period, Protestant 
Christianity was of paramount importance as the coagulant 
of our social diversity. During the nineteenth century, ex­
pansion and spread-eagle nationalism served that role. 
Since then, perhaps, it has been our extraordinary affluence 
and standard of living. As the need to readjust our standard 
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and style of living emerges ever more clearly, it is not at all 
certain what will serve as our source of societal cohesion 
during the century ahead. Nevertheless, our uncertainty in 
this respect should be taken as a challenge, for as one friend 
has remarked of American history: "Not the "manifestness* 
but the uncertainty of the national destiny was the great 
motive and emotive power of the national life." 
For much too long, perhaps, the American sense of 
destiny—indeed, of being God's Chosen People—was con­
tingent upon the land's abundance. Good harvests and 
happy business cycles were taken to mean that Providence 
had singled us out for special blessings.56 The largesse of 
Nature's Nation has not really diminished (yet); but there are 
many more inhabaitants of Nature's Nation in 1976 than 
there were in 1776 or even 1876. Therefore our destiny may 
ultimately depend not so much upon abundance, but upon 
our own resourcefulness in husbanding it. If we meet that 
challenge, then we may, like the Puritan founders quoting 
from Deuteronomy, hope to gaze upon "a land wherein thou 
shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack any 
thing in it."57 
Half a dozen colleagues have been kind enough to read this essay and 
share with me their critical responses and suggestions: Jane N. Garrett, 
Samuel P. Hays, Walter F. LaFeber, Peter McClelland, Richard Polenberg, 
and Elliott Rudwick. In thanking these good friends, I do not mean to taint 
them in any way for the flaws that remain; for I have not followed their 
advice in every instance—at my peril, to be sure. Nevertheless, I appreciate 
all their efforts to set me straight. I also wish to thank my hosts at Ohio State 
University, especially Professors Marvin Zahniser and Richard Snyder, for 
their hospitality and thoughtfulness during the delightful days of my visit: 
17-19 October 1976. 
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Seymour Martin Lipset 
Growth, Affluence, and the 
Limits of Futurology 
We are engaged here in an exercise in futurology, to discuss 
the consequences for the United States and the world of a 
change in the evaluation of the prospects for continued 
economic growth. This conference is, in large measure, a 
result of the emergence of neo-Malthusianism in the world. 
Some economists and other social analysts have concluded 
that the pattern of steady growth that characterized the 
Western world since the Industrial Revolution began must 
come to an end. It is also assumed that the dreams or aspira­
tions underlying the efforts of less-developed countries to 
dramatically increase their productive systems are Utopian. 
They cannot aspire to become wealthy industrialized 
societies. The underlying assumptions for these pessimistic 
conclusions are fairly simple. The neo-Malthusians point to 
the considerable increase in population of the world, one 
that will continue to the point where we will inevitably have 
many more billions than we now have. Secondly, they note 
that the resources that have sustained industrial develop­
ment in the west, particularly those that have contributed 
energy and raw materials for industry and transportation, 
are not inexhaustible. The best known version of this view is 
contained in the report from the Club of Rome, Limits to 
Growth.1 
Western industrialized countries, the principal claimants 
for such materials until recently, absorb an inordinate pro­
portion of them. Immediately after World War II, it was 
estimated that the 6 percent of the world's population living 
in the United States consumed about 50 percent of the raw 
materials used for industrial purposes. With the postwar 
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growth of other Western economies and also demands from 
less-developed countries, the proportion of an increased 
world supply now used by the United States is one-third. In 
any case, the developed countries of North America, Europe, 
Japan, and Australasia clearly consume considerably more 
than half of these resources, but they have less than a quarter 
of the world's population. Beyond these two main structural 
considerations, some advocate the cessation of growth in the 
foreseeable future because of value judgments which insist 
that growth has brought with it various negative or dysfunc­
tional consequences for humankind. These negative effects 
lie in the area of ecology. Industrial growth has dirtied the 
world in a variety of ways that make conditions of life less 
good, or less healthful, and in social relations, the ways in 
which the pace of life in a large-scale industrial society is 
highly competitive, ultramaterialistic, and bureaucratic. 
The critics argue that the advanced industrial societies have 
produced not human happiness but rather a variety of social 
and psychological and biological morbidities. Thus it is 
argued on one hand that growth will have to stop because of 
the changing ratio of available resources to the population, 
and that it should stop because it produces a bad world. I 
shall not attempt to further elaborate the arguments of those 
who anticipate or favor an end to growth, since I assume that 
one of the contributors to this volume, Kenneth Boulding, 
will have done this in his essay. 
These pessimistic views are countered by other 
economists and social thinkers who believe that a Malthu­
sian perspective today is as erroneous as it was when 
Malthus first contended that the inevitable growth in popu­
lation would prevent an increase in wealth. The counter-
view holds that much as Malthus underestimated the re­
sources that could be located and the inventive ingenuity of 
the human race, his contemporary disciples make the same 
error. 
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The most optimistic version of this position has been 
argued by the deputy editor of the Economist, Norman Mac­
rae, one that is about as diametrically opposite to the views 
assumed by the report of the Club of Rome as is conceivable. 
He anticipated in 1972 that within the next eighty years, the 
poorer "two-thirds of mankind should be raised from in­
tolerable indigence to something better than the comfortable 
affluence which the other one-third of us already enjoy." In 
fact, he contends that much of the needed increase in the 
less-developed countries will occur by 2012. Among other 
reasons for such optimism is his belief that scientific knowl­
edge and technological development have been proceeding 
exponentially and that continuing even more rapid ad­
vances will solve the limits and pollution problems.2 He 
suggests that it is 
probable that during at least our children's lifetimes the even­
tual breakthrough to widespread and intelligent use of comput­
ers will add totally new dimensions to all of man's traditional 
powers of deduction and induction and serendipity . . . that 
this will drive human invention and innovation through a grow­
ing ability to put together matter molecule by molecule, through 
extraordinary new abilities to control natural phenomena (the 
weather, drawing all the energy we need from the fusion process 
that will utilize the waters of the oceans as their limitless reser­
voir of fuel). . . .3 
Macrae's views have been reiterated recently by the 
editors of the Economist writing collectively. They suggest 
that the factors that helped contradict Malthus's predictions 
in Britain, namely, a combination of clean water, better 
diets, and greater self-help and dignity, are emerging in the 
less-developed world today. They argue that "there is now a 
world-wide movement towards Chadwickian sanitary re­
forms" that promises to produce "supplies of clean water all 
over the earth by 1990." "There is a hope for green revolu­
tions; [and] the building of a foundation of Third World 
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self-help." Birth control drives in various Third World coun­
tries will end "the people explosion. And man will find the 
natural resources he needs—abundantly available."4 
An equally optimistic view is contained in a recent book, 
The Next 200 Years, written by Herman Kahn, William 
Brown, and Leon Martel of the Hudson Institute. Their thesis 
"can be summarized with the general statement that 200 
years ago almost everywhere human beings were compara­
tively few, poor, and at the mercy of the forces of nature, and 
200 years from now, we expect, almost everywhere they will 
be numerous, rich, and in control of the forces of nature." 
This optimistic scenario notes that in 1776 there were 750 
million people in the world and a $150 billion gross world 
product, which came to $200 per capita in fixed 1975 dol­
lars. In 1976 there were 4.1 billion people, a $5.5 trillion 
gross world product, or $1,300 per capita income. One 
hundred years from now at the time of the American tricen­
tennial, their prognosis is for a world of 15 billion people, 
with $300 trillion in gross world product, or a $20,000 per 
capita income in fixed 1975 dollars. They assume further 
that at the time of the tricentennial there will have been a 
leveling-off tendency with respect to population growth.s 
The Next 200 Years points to a number of factors that make 
this scenario plausible. These include evidence that the 
birthrates are declining in many less-developed countries, 
and that a variety of population experts agree that the 
maximum rate of growth will soon be reached. Kahn et al. 
point to the fact that those who are pessimistic about the 
potentiality for growth in less-developed countries have 
been wrong, since the UN's original goal for the decade of 
development of 5 percent growth has been not only met but 
considerably exceeded. Further, they agree with Macrae that 
long-term energy prospects are good, that these rest in fact 
on "sources that are inexhaustible." Sources of raw mate­
rials are great and are continuing to grow, e.g., there are 
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various sources such as ocean nodules that will in fact in­
crease the supplies of many materials needed by industry. 
As the world moves to post-industrial economies, it will 
become increasingly less dependent on many metals. Recy­
cling as an economic factor has only begun to play a role, but 
will contribute much to the raw material potential in the 
future. Kahn et al. also argue that the anxiety about the 
availability of food to feed whatever size population of the 
world comes into existence is much exaggerated, that at the 
moment the problem is not production but inadequate dis­
tribution systems. This clearly can be remedied. In addition, 
agricultural technology can increase food production 
enormously in countries which today are not food surplus 
countries. 
Herman Kahn is, of course, known for having exorbitant 
ideas and for allowing his chronic optimism to perhaps 
outweigh pessimistic facts. He himself has noted that he 
always chooses the optimistic side in commenting on differ­
ences he has had with colleagues. It should be noted, there­
fore, that views such as those expressed by Macrae and Kahn 
are not idiosyncratic curious ones. Similar views have also 
been advanced by a number of major economists. Thus, 
William Nordhaus and James Tobin of Yale in a well-known 
article "Is Growth Obsolete?" deny that "the problem of 
natural resources becomes an increasingly severe drag on 
economic growth." In fact, they suggest that "the opposite 
appears to be more likely."6 They also stress that technologi­
cal innovation has always taken care of the need to shift from 
one set of materials to another, that market processes lead to 
developments that fill needs. They say that the "nightmare 
of a day of reckoning in economic collapse when, for exam­
ple, all fossil fuels are forever gone seems to be based on a 
failure to recognize the existing and future possibilities of 
substitute materials and processes. As the day of reckoning 
approaches, fuel prices will provide—as they do not now— 
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strong incentives for such substitutions, as well as for the 
conservation of remaining supplies."7They draw optimistic 
conclusions about the possibilities for approaching zero 
population growth on a world scale from past experience of 
developed countries, more particularly the United States.8 
Similar conclusions are reached in a number of articles by 
economists and others in the fall 1973 issue of Daedalus, on 
"The No Growth Society." These disagree on technical as 
well as value grounds with the pessimistic predictions. 
Some of the authors agree with Nordhaus and Tobin that 
zero population growth (ZPG) does not mean zero economic 
growth (ZEG). Harvard economist Richard Zeckhauser con­
cludes that "growth is not pernicious but desirable."9 He 
counters the thesis of exhaustible resources with the argu­
ment that as one type of resource becomes limited in availa­
bility a changing price structure results in substitutions 
becoming available. This occurred in the past and there is no 
reason to anticipate that it will not happen in the future. He 
argues in detail that the contentions by critics of growth that 
growth inevitably produces various negative social and en­
vironmental consequences are not documented, and in any 
case that many of the existing dysfunctional effects can be 
eliminated. 
Kenneth Boulding, who agrees with the no-growth advo­
cates that in the long run the "present process of expansion" 
cannot go on, that there are a limited amount of resources on 
"spaceship earth," nevertheless seems to project the time in 
which expansion must stop into the somewhat distant future 
from the point of view of the present inhabitants of the 
planet. He notes, as have others, that "the dramatic decline 
of fertility in the whole temperate zone has already 
made [Club of Rome] projections obsolete."10 
More recently, a new survey dealing with "World Popula­
tion Trends" by Lester Brown, issued in October 1976, re­
ports that worldwide "the rate of growth has slowed so 
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dramatically over the past five years that a long-predicted 
doubling of the population may not occur." Brown stated: "I 
would not be surprised if the world population never again 
doubled." The worldwide population growth rate dropped 
from 1.9 percent to 1.64 between 1970 and 1975, the first 
such decline in world history. In the most populous country, 
China, the birthrate declined sharply from 32 to 19 births per 
thousand people.11 
On 13 October 1976 an international group of economists 
headed by Nobel Laureate, Wassily Leontief, who had been 
commissioned by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs to investigate the problems of 
growth, reported after three years of research that "world 
resources will be sufficient to support a growing population 
and higher living standards, without inevitable environ­
mental damage." The existing limits to growth, according to 
them, are not scarce resources, but political and institutional 
deficiencies. They call for accelerated rates of development 
in the less-developed countries.12 
These disagreements among eminent economists and so­
cial scientists concerning the constraints or lack of con­
straints that affect the potential for growth and increased 
affluence on a national as well as on a world scale are, of 
course, not unique to the current discussion. They clearly 
point up the need for further research to test the validity of 
the different assumptions made by advocates on each side. It 
is not likely, however, that this debate will be resolved in the 
foreseeable future by more data, better theory, or more 
sophisticated arguments.13 
The Limits to Futurology and Social Science Analysis 
The controversies about the limits to growth point up once 
again the difficulties involved in efforts at futurology, for it 
seems clear that social scientists can explain only a small 
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part of the variance involved in dealing with the major 
societal or worldwide issues that concern them. To a consid­
erable degree, scholars like other people tend to react to 
what are often short-term changes in mood defining the 
major pn-blems that require analysis and understanding. 
Many changes, initially perceived as secular structural ones, 
occur in waves that ebb and flow, though not necessarily in 
any kind of regular cycle. 
Rudolf Klein has noted that the dominant concerns of the 
young field of futurology itself have changed dramatically. 
"Indeed, just to glance at some recent products is to realize 
how quickly intellectual fashions now oscillate: man's fu­
ture (if one is to believe the professional social prophets) is 
changing almost on a year to year basis." In the 1960s 
futurologists were concerned with the ways to secure 
growth, with the negative implications of automation, with 
the problems of nuclear destruction. 
Now, five years later, it appears that the world's long-term future 
has suddenly changed. We no longer live under the shadow of 
nuclear war. We are no longer faced by the threat of enforced 
idleness brought on by automation. We are no longer faced by 
the danger of domination by an all-knowing because all-
computerized bureaucracy or by a military-industrial elite (to 
quote some other prophetic visions of the past). Instead we are 
told that we are living in the shadow of an overpopulated, 
overexploited, overproducing and overconsuming world.14 
Social scientists, working on more specialized topics, 
cannot boast of a better record. Our standard operative pro­
cedure seems to be to account for a current trend, or current 
definition of the mess that we are in, by looking for other 
concomitant structural trends. Since the structural tenden­
cies associated with the trend we are trying to explain or find 
solutions for generally continue, while more often than not 
the trend or problem that concerns us disappears or ebbs 
away, much of our interpretive analysis turns out to be 
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inadequate. This can be seen by looking back at some of the 
kinds of analyses and predictions made by social scientists 
and economists over the past three decades, that is, since 
World War II. An examination of this record suggests that we 
should be exceedingly modest about using our status as 
experts to draw conclusions that call for major policy 
changes. I would like to briefly mention some of these. 
The first misprediction is the depression that never ar­
rived. As we all know, the Great Depression of the 1930s was 
not ended by the natural play of economic forces, or, in most 
countries, by deliberate government action. Rather, mass 
unemployment and low prices were eliminated by World 
War II. Many economists generally assumed, therefore, that 
once the war ended large-scale unemployment would reoc­
cur, particularly in those industries and areas that had con­
centrated heavily on defense work. 
Scholars were so certain of this development that a 
number of research projects were planned that involved 
studying the impact of unemployment on people who had 
been employed during the war. Detailed interviews were 
made with people whose jobs were certain to disappear with 
the end of the war. The call by Henry Wallace and others for 
government planning to guarantee 60 million jobs was dis­
missed as Utopian. In fact, as we know, there was no postwar 
depression of any major consequence. The developed world 
has sustained three decades of relatively high levels of 
employment. The varying recessions have resulted in lower 
rates of unemployment than some prewar levels, such as the 
1920s, that had been considered as periods of prosperity. 
It is now almost forgotten that continued depression-
consciousness in the late 1950s and early 1960s led to many 
economists' paying considerable attention to finding ways 
to speed up growth both within the United States and on a 
world scale. As Henry Wallich has noted: 
There can be little doubt that, particularly following the re­
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cession of 1957-1958, economists began to go overboard in their 
glorification of growth. In part this was a political response to 
the slow growth of the late 1950s, in part a reflection of the 
impact of Sputnik. The interest of less-developed countries in 
catching up helped to cast growth in the role of an all-absorbing 
goal at that time.15 
Economists, on the whole, also failed to anticipate the 
change in the relationship between unemployment and in­
flation. It had always been assumed that inflation was nega­
tively related with increases in unemployment. This as­
sumption has not held up for various periods in the postwar 
epoch, particularly the recession of the seventies, from 
which we are just emerging. 
Norman Macrae has also pointed to the inadequacies of 
economic forecasts. He notes: 
Over the first 20 postwar years, a majority of important 
decision-influencing people at one time or another forecast 
coming famines in six main particular products. The world then 
progressively created unsaleable and unprofitable surpluses in 
every one of them: temperate foodstuffs after 1947, raw mate­
rials after 1951, "manufactured goods that could conceivably 
ever be sold to the United States and bridge the dollar gap" after 
about 1954, fuels (especially coal after 1945, and oil after Suez), 
orthodoxly trained university students (especially in the sci­
ence faculties) after I960.16 
It is with good reason that Robert Heilbroner has em­
phasized the difficulties faced by economists in predicting 
the future of a national economy, saying that "it may be that 
this is less possible than it was, because the economy itself 
now is so much more a creature of decision making, and so 
much less the outcome of sheer interplay of impersonal 
forces, that prediction becomes inherently more difficult."17 
Wassily Leontief is even more pessimistic about the abil­
ity of economics to formulate generalizations that withstand 
change. As he put it in his presidential address to the Ameri­
can Economic Association in 1971: 
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In contrast to most physical sciences, we study a system that is 
not only exceedingly complex but also in a state of constant flux. 
I have in mind not the obvious changes in the variables. . that 
our equations are supposed to explain, but the basic structural 
relationships described by the form and the parameters of these 
equations. In order to know what the shape of the structural 
relationships actually are at any given time, we have to keep 
them under continuous surveillance.18 
In citing these problems of economic analysis, I am not 
suggesting that economics is not able to explain or to under­
stand what has happened since 1945. Economists, like the 
rest of us, are good historians, that is, they are able to find the 
factors that explain and retrospectively predict what oc­
curred. Somehow, however, they have not been very good 
forecasters. 
Demography, a border-line discipline falling between 
sociology and economics, also can not boast of its record. 
Extrapolating from the history of Western countries, demog­
raphers formulated the "theory of the demographic transi­
tion," which projected a steady decline in the rate of popula­
tion growth in advanced societies characterized by "the 
achievement of general literacy, urbanization, and indus­
trialization" and the diffusion of knowledge of birth control 
methods. But as Dudley Kirk noted in the mid-1960s, the 
theory seemed to break down about World War II. 
It is ironic that demographers developed the techniques for 
projecting certain long-standing trends in the components of 
population growth, especially in natality, just at a time when 
these trends were about to dissolve. New attitudes favoring 
earlier marriage and more children appeared in the very 
societies where the great majority of families had been practic­
ing birth control. The recovery of the birthrate in Western coun­
tries just before, during, and especially after World War II vio­
lated the projection of previous trends and those formulations of 
the demographic transition that considered western countries to 
be approaching a stationary or declining population.19 
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As we all know, this period did not last either. Kenneth 
Boulding concludes that 
fertility seems to be subject to quite unpredictable shifts. Thus, 
in the United States we had a period of high fertility (1947-1961) 
which was quite unpredicted, now we are in a phase of low 
fertility which was equally unpredicted. It would be a 
rash prophet, however, who would assert that there could not be 
an equally unexpected rise in the future, or even a further unex­
pected drop, to the point where one country or another would 
exhibit the "fertility shock" which Rumania went into in 1969, 
when, apparently, it suddenly hit the Rumanian government 
that Rumanians might simply die out.20 
The same concern has recently been voiced in Australia, 
which has reached the zero population growth level. The 
slogan "populate or perish" has been revived as students of 
demographic trends warn Australians that "they may be a 
dying race."21 
Economists and demographers, of course, do not have the 
worst record. Other social scientists are equally inefficient. 
Problems anticipated by a considerable amount of social 
science literature that society would face in reabsorbing the 
veterans of World War II for the most part simply did not 
occur, either on the level of collective or of individual be­
havior. The sociological literature of the 1950s addressed 
itself in some part to explaining what seemed to be major 
basic changes in the American national character. Those 
who agreed that the conservative fifties reflected increased 
secular pressures for conformism in American society range 
in political point of view from Erich Fromm and C. Wright 
Mills to William White and David Riesman. They sought to 
explain structurally the increased prevalence of other-
directed or market-oriented personalities, which had re­
placed the once dominant inner-directed or producer-
oriented types. The change was related to the shift from an 
economy of small producers, a labor force a major segment of 
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which was self-employed in agriculture or business, to one 
in which the large majority worked within large-scale 
bureaucracies. The analysts suggested that the latter envi­
ronment tended to produce conformists, for people within 
bureaucracies advance by selling themselves, by impressing 
superiors and colleagues. In the earlier society people suc­
ceeded by working hard and intensively, with much less 
concern for the opinions of others. The logically predictable 
conformist decade of the fifties was followed, as we know, 
by the non-conformism of the late sixties and early seven­
ties. Yet, the structural environment, the trends that al­
legedly produced comformist trends, were present in a more 
intensive fashion in the late 1960s. 
Sociologists also erred in their anticipations about the 
class structure of American society. Leftist students of 
stratification such as Robert Lynd and C. Wright Mills and 
conservative sociologists such as August Hollingshead and 
W. Lloyd Warner suggested that the high level of social 
mobility, which characterized American society, was a con­
sequence of economic growth and geographical expansion, 
trends that could not continue indefinitely. The growth of 
large-scale corporations, the decline in self-employment, 
were also logically expected to reduce opportunity. Many 
anticipated the emergence of hard, fixed class lines and 
conflict as a result. Such anticipations also turned out to be 
erroneous. What the experts failed to evaluate properly was 
the change in the occupational structure. The proportion of 
lowly, unskilled positions has steadily declined—it is now 
under 10 percent, while middle- and upper-level jobs, re­
quiring more education, have increased. Where we once had 
a pyramidal structure with many menial jobs at the bottom, 
we now have shifted to a diamond-shaped one, which 
bulges at the middle. Social mobility on a mass level remains 
as high or higher than ever. 
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The analysts of stratification also failed to anticipate that 
the combination of rapid expansion of higher education 
facilities, which permits persons from relatively deprived 
backgrounds to go to universities, and the end of the family 
business and the concomitant growth of large-scale corpo­
rate bureaucracies, together with the increase in govern­
ment, would create new possibilities for the lowly to rise 
within the corporate ladder of industry and the bureaucratic 
hierarchy of government. A much larger proportion of the 
heads of major companies now come from poor social ori­
gins than ever before in American history.22 
As a result of these developments, there appears to be less 
rather than more emphasis on status (family class) 
background, and more social egalitarianism. The technolog­
ical revolution—computerization, increased automation— 
has reduced the proportion in the lower class. Increased 
mechanization has led to greater equality. Comparable 
structural trends may be noted throughout the developed 
world. 
The most striking example of a generalized failure of 
sociologists to anticipate developments may be found in the 
area of ethnicity. Until recently, Marxist and non-Marxist 
scholars agreed on a standardized set of generalizations 
about ethnic and national minorities. These assumed that 
ethnicity reflected the conditions of traditional society, in 
which people live in small communities isolated from one 
another, in which mass communications*and transportation 
were limited. Most scholars anticipated that industrializa­
tion, urbanization and the mass spread of education would 
operate to reduce ethnic consciousness, that universalism 
would replace particularism. Marxists were certain that 
socialism would mean the end of ethnic tension and con­
sciousness on the levels that existed in pre-socialist 
societies. Non-Marxist sociologists in Western countries as­
sumed that the processes of industrialization and moderni­
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zation would do the same. Assimilation by minorities into a 
large integrated whole was viewed as the inevitable future. 
As two scholars of the subject, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. 
Moynihan note, it was generally believed that "divisions of 
culture, religions, language," and race 
would inevitably lose their weight and sharpness in modern and 
modernizing societies, that there would be increasing emphasis 
on achievement rather than ascription, that common systems of 
education and communication would level differences, that 
nationally uniform economic and political systems would have 
the same effect. Under these circumstances the "primordial" (or 
in any case antecedent) differences between groups would be 
expected to become of lesser significance. The "liberal expec­
tancy" flows into the "radical expectancy"—that class cir­
cumstances would become the main line of division between 
people, erasing the earlier lines of tribe, language, religion, 
national origin, and that thereafter these class divisions would 
themselves, after revolution, disappear. Thus Karl Marx and his 
followers reacted with impatience to the heritage of the past, as 
they saw it, in the form of ethnic attachments.23 
As we all know, the opposite has occurred, both in the 
Western and communist worlds, and in the less-developed 
world as well. The Achilles heel of communism has turned 
out to be nationalism, not only the consciousness of Poles 
and Czechs vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but of the various 
national groupings within Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
as well. At a private dinner meeting two years ago, Anthony 
Crosland, minister of foreign affairs in Great Britain, when 
asked his view of the major problems facing the United 
Kingdom in the next ten years replied that it was whether 
there would be any United Kingdom. He felt that there is 
only a 50-50 chance that Scotland would still be part of the 
United Kingdom a decade hence. Most of the other multilin­
gual, binational or bi-religious states that have persisted for 
many decades, if not centuries, have faced turmoil in recent 
years. Canada, Belgium, Malaysia, and Lebanon all face 
80 Growth, Affluence, and the Limits of Futurology 
crises of national existence in which minorities press for 
autonomy if not independence. Pakistan and Cyprus have 
divided. Nigeria suppressed an ethnic rebellion. In the clas­
sic Swiss case, tension has risen within multilinguistic can­
tons. France faces difficulties with its Basques, Bretons, and 
Corsicans. In Spain, Basques and Catalans demand linguis­
tic rights and greater autonomy. 
In seeking to explain, after the fact, the disintegration of 
previously united societies, some social scientists have in 
characteristic fashion inverted the causal process, that is, 
they identify the processes that once were supposed to be 
leading to a decline in differences as the cause of their 
increase. As Eugene Skolnikoff notes: 
The old belief that growing interdependence among nations 
would breed at least a sense of common purpose, and more 
hopefully a genuine community of values, has proven a weak 
reed at best. Unexpectedly rapid growth in the relations and 
dependencies across national borders has not reduced strife but 
rather has sharpened divisions and distinctions. Much of the 
change can be traced to the more rapid development and appli­
cation of technology than was or could have been predicted, a 
phenomenon that still appears to be accelerating. In­
creased openness and interconnectedness had led to new areas 
of dispute, breakdown of concerns within nations.24 
Sociological generalizations about the necessary func­
tional requirements for the stability of family relationships 
that supposedly affected relationships between men and 
women also have turned out to be contradicted by develop­
ments. One may find many references, including in my own 
writings, to the proposition that sex cannot be a source of 
major political difference, that the members of the same 
family unit must have similar social-political attitudes. Role 
differentiation between men and women, husbands and 
wives, fathers and mothers, was perceived as fulfilling func­
tional needs. Affective, that is emotional, relationships and 
instrumental ones were seen as being dealt with by different 
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sexes because they could not be handled well by the same 
persons. Biological sex differences led to sex being used as a 
way of differentiating roles within families and societies. 
Once again, the events of recent years require some serious 
modification of these standard assumptions and predic­
tions. 
Political analysis is in no better shape. During the early 
1950s in the United States, I was one of a group of scholars 
who attempted to explain the phenomenon of McCar­
thyism.25 Most of us linked it to the tensions of a prosperous 
society that produced heightened status concerns and 
anxieties, increased competition among groups and indi­
viduals who were rising or falling in status. Status politics, 
rather than class politics, seemingly characterized such 
periods. The underlying trends that supposedly produced 
increased status tensions have continued, but McCarthy ism 
disappeared with the end of the Korean War. There are, of 
course, other continuing forms of group tension, such as the 
rise of white racist movements, that may be properly linked 
to status threats. It is clear, however, that the broad predic­
tive power of the theory of status politics is nowhere near as 
strong as suggested in the early fifties.26 
The post-McCarthy era found many people analyzing "the 
end of ideology," or, as in my own case, the "decline."27 The 
reduction in ideological tensions within advanced indus­
trial societies was related in large measure to growing afflu­
ence, to the incorporation of previously excluded strata into 
the body politic, to the spread of education, and to the 
seeming reduction of many of the extreme morbidities of 
industrial society through the institutionalization of the 
planning and welfare state. Although many of the analysts of 
the end of ideology excluded intellectuals and young people 
from their generalizations about the decline of ideology, it is 
largely true that few anticipated the emergence of the forms 
of protest that have characterized the growth of the New Left 
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and minority movements in the late sixties and early seven­
ties. 
The New Left and the New Politics of the sixties and 
seventies, which drew their strength heavily from the uni­
versities and from the ranks of the intelligentsia, the edu­
cated professional strata, were in turn subjected to scholarly 
analysis. In this country and elsewhere the student revolt 
was explained in part by changes in the situation of the 
students, particularly within the university. It was argued 
that the growth of large massive bureaucratic universities, of 
a mass student and faculty population, all made the experi­
ence of being a student much less pleasant, and offered less 
prospects for the future, than ever before. The Berkeley Re­
volt and its successors were seen in some considerable de­
gree to reflect a protest against bureaucracy and impersonal­
ity, and the pressures on students to prepare for materialistic 
careers.28 The mid-seventies, however, are characterized by 
a "calm," a period of political quiescence on campus, al­
though the structural conditions that supposedly produced 
student protest still continue and, if anything, have inten­
sified. Pressures on students to conform to educational au­
thority, to devote their education to preparing themselves 
for a niche in the economy, are stronger than ever. 
A leading political scientist, Gabriel Almond, after citing 
comparable analytic failures, notes that the "inherent weak­
ness and softness of social regularities leads to equally weak 
and soft social theories. .Because the regularities are 
subject both to drift and sudden changes, the theories based 
upon them can quickly become obsolete. That this has been 
the case in political science is clear."29 
Some who adhere to Marxism or other revolutionary doc­
trines may react to this brief survey of the inadequacy of 
social science analysis by concluding that it demonstrates 
the failure of bourgeois or non-radical social science. But if 
one looks at Marxism, it is certainly in no better shape. 
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Marxist economists and sociologists made comparable er­
rors to the non-Marxists in evaluating economic develop­
ments, ethnicity, and the prospects for political tensions in 
Western industrialized societies. A major figure in radical 
sociology, Alvin Gouldner, has pointed out that the record of 
"academic sociology" has been superior to that of the Marx­
ists in anticipating various recent changes, that the non-
Marxists were more sensitive than the Marxists.30 Marxist 
economists have been repeatedly disconfirmed in their an­
ticipations of economic breakdown in the West and of lack of 
growth in less-developed societies. 
On a broader scale, however, it may be said that Marxism's 
major assumptions and predictions about the transition to 
socialism bear little or no relationship to actual develop­
ments. Capitalism's progressive role, according to Marxist 
theory, has been to create a level of production that would 
enable people to live in genuine freedom for the first time in 
history, that would permit everyone to have enough and 
thus make possible a much more egalitarian, if not a totally 
egalitarian, society. Marxists, until World War I, assumed 
that the United States would be the first socialist country 
because it was the most-advanced capitalist country. Marx 
wrote categorically that the most-developed society pre­
sents to others the image of their future. Social superstruc­
tures, political systems, were supposed to follow in the train 
of economic development. 
The Russian Bolsheviks regarded their seizure of power in 
a less-developed country as a historic anomaly that could 
not and would not last. They anticipated that the only possi­
bility for a progressive advance in the Soviet Union lay in its 
being tied up to advanced socialist industrial countries in 
the West. They looked forward eagerly to the outbreak of the 
revolution in Western countries. No crueler joke has been 
played by history than the phenomenon of Marxism becom­
ing the banner of the revolutionary movements of totally 
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non-industrial societies, of communism holding power in 
China, in Cambodia, Albania, and many other poor, largely 
agrarian nations. Conversely, of course, revolutionary 
Marxism is weakest in the countries with the highest level of 
industrial development, those that have the largest working 
class, the highest standard of living. Literally, no relation­
ship exists between Marx's anticipations about the links 
between economic structure, technological development, 
and social and political development, and what has actually 
happened. Marxism as a system of sociological, economic, 
and political analysis has been negated, not only by events 
in the Western industrial countries, which have seemingly 
overcome the anticipation that their contradictions would 
produce massive economic crises, but even more fundamen­
tally by the coming to power of socialist statist movements 
in less-developed countries. Statism in a total sense seems to 
be a phenomenon of less-developed, non-industrial 
societies, the precise opposite of Marx's forecast. 
In citing the failures or, more accurately, inadequate pre­
dictions of the assorted social sciences, it is not my intention 
to suggest that social science is unable to deal with social 
and economic phenomena. Clearly, all the disciplines have 
done much to explain the ways in which economy, society, 
and individuals behave. Social science, however, is still at 
its best in advancing what Robert Merton has called 
middle-range theories and in explaining specific time and 
place-limited developments. It can best handle interrela­
tionships between two or more variables within specific 
delimited structures. As social science moves out to deal 
with macroscopic systemic trends and tendencies it ac­
counts for smaller and smaller parts of the variance. 
Economists escape some of this problem theoretically by 
dealing with analytically closed systems, based on limited 
sets of assumptions. They, however, are no more able than 
other social analysts to fully comprehend total system be­
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havior. Our enduring analyses tend to be historical. There is 
nothing wrong with this. In many ways our best work re­
sembles that of physicians, who analyze the behavior of 
specific individuals, rather than of biologists, who specify 
the characteristics of a total stable system. 
A recent paper by a leading psychologist, Lee Cronbach, 
discusses precisely the same difficulties faced by his sup­
posedly more experimental and scientific field. Cronbach 
cites many examples of experimentally validated generali­
zations that no longer hold up. He notes: 
Generalizations decay. At one time a conclusion describes the 
existing situation well, at a later time it accounts for rather little 
variance, and ultimately it is valid only as history. The half-life 
of an empirical proposition may be great or small. The more 
open a system, the shorter the half-life of relations within are 
likely to be. 
Though enduring systemic theories about man in society are 
not likely to be achieved, systematic inquiry can realistically 
hope to make two contributions. One reasonable aspiration is to 
assess local events accurately, to improve short-run control. The 
other reasonable aspiration is to develop explanatory concepts 
that will help people use their heads.31 
Gabriel Almond also concludes that the inherent failure of 
political science to formulate enduring generalizations 
"means that it must again move closer to the historical and 
philosophical disciplines which gave it birth. The return to 
history will put us back in touch with the substance of 
political processes, and will help us recover the humility 
which is appropriate to a science of humanity carried on by 
humans."32 
This emphasis on middle-range theory and on historical 
case studies does not mean that we should not try to deal 
with macroscopic developments or predict future trends. 
Sociologists analyze consequences of changes in the propor­
tion of the population who reach varying levels of educa­
tion, differences in the distribution of occupations, e.g., the 
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decline in the number of manual or skilled positions and the 
increase in professional or technical employment discussed 
earlier. We know that higher education is associated with 
certain kinds of values and behavior, while different occupa­
tions are conducive to varying life styles and patterns of 
social organization, and have specific orientations to com­
petition, work, and the like, associated with them. Presuma­
bly, then, a systematic change in the composition of the 
work force or of the age levels of population should have 
determinate though not necessarily predictable effects on 
the body politic. 
Yet it should be noted that we cannot predict secular 
changes on a system level or the probability of events from 
changes in the composition of a population, or the relative 
weight of the same factor in different systems. Thus, there is 
abundant evidence that the more education people have, the 
more tolerance they have for ambiguity, the more likely they 
are to be free of bigotry, to support civil liberties and civil 
rights. From this fact it ought to follow that, as the popula­
tion of a country becomes better educated, it should be more 
protective of minority rights. In fact, as we know, this is not 
true. The McCarthyite America of the 1950s was the best-
educated America up to that time. Periods of massive in­
tolerance have recurred frequently over the two centuries of 
American history although education and wealth have in­
creased secularly. On a comparative scale we may point to 
the fact that some of the best-educated nations have fallen 
victim to persecution manias, such as Germany in 1933. 
Clearly, unpredictable combinations of specific events or 
factors frequently negate the weight of the most powerful 
structural factors. 
An interesting example of such a reversal upsetting a 
structural prediction may be taken from political science. In 
1965 Robert Lane, an eminent political scientist at Yale, 
published two articles in the American PoiiticaJ Science 
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Review and the American Sociological Review reporting on 
evidence from public opinion polls and other sources that 
indicated a steadily growing degree of satisfaction with the 
body politic and economic among the population from 1938 
until 1965.33 The changes included an increase in commit­
ment to values and norms sustaining tolerance, free speech, 
and participation in the democratic political system. Lane 
attributed such changes to the steady growth in affluence 
and in education of every stratum in the population. The 
opinion polls showed that the better-educated and the more 
well-to-do a person is, the more tolerant he is of others and 
the more satisfied he is with his own situation and the body 
politic. Yet, as we all know, 1965 was the end of an epoch. 
From 1965 to the early 1970s almost every indicator that 
Lane used of satisfaction and tolerance declined rapidly.34 
The reaction to the Vietnam War followed by Watergate and 
the revelations about activities of various American security 
agencies plus, in the latter years of the period, economic 
recession, brought about a steady reduction in confidence in 
the American polity and increased intolerance. Yet, until 
1972 all the structural trends that Lane had identified as 
concomitants of the growth in positive attitudes in behavior 
continued. 
To repeat, this discussion is not meant to imply that we 
should not try to analyze and predict. Quite obviously in 
economic as in political or other forms of social behavior, 
more knowledge and systematic thinking is better than less 
knowledge. But when one is involved in making major pol­
icy recommendations and decisions for the future of nations 
or, in the case of the Club of Rome, for the world, it is 
necessary to be humble, to be cautious, to know much more 
than we do, before being able to state conclusively that 
humankind's commitment to growth should stop. Clearly, 
the less precision in an analysis or prediction, the more 
unexplained variance, the more likely that the conclusions 
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that people reach from the available data reflect what they 
want to find, whether that what stems from political ideol­
ogy, an academic or intellectual theoretical commitment, 
self-interest, or something else. 
As political scientist James Q. Wilson has stressed, social 
science can test (predict) the relationship among factors 
only when it can isolate them from other variables, and 
when the factors and their effects are unambiguous and 
easily measurable. But the most significant effects on a 
societal level rarely meet these criteria. 
Either the effects to be studied are hard to measure (as with 
educational attainment or true crime rates) or the possible ef­
fects are hard to define and detect (as with most habits of mind 
and of personality), or the possible explanatory factors are hard 
to disentangle (as with race, class, and education), or the act of 
studying the situation alters it.35 
This means that with almost any complex problem, such 
as the implications of growth or no-growth, people who 
disagree about the consequences of a given policy will rarely 
resolve their disagreement by reference to research. The 
improvement in research techniques—made possible by 
use, for example, of the computer—has not increased the 
likelihood of reliable, unambiguous results. 
Concerns about Growth 
The recent increase in writing about the negative con­
sequences of growth, of affluence, of industrialization, of 
urbanization, revive to some degree recurrent intellectual 
and political concerns. Periodically Americans have voiced 
anxieties comparable to the present. As literary historian 
Daniel Aaron has pointed out, throughout American history 
preaching of lay or secular jeremiads feared what the phenome­
non of growth (wealth, progress, power) might do to unregener­
ate America. Had not this surfeit of success, this obsession with 
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progress, induced them to connive with the devil in stealing 
land from Mexico, condoning slavery, cheating Indians, 
exploiting workers, tolerating slums. 
In recent years the critique of growth has not altered much 
although it has taken on a different tack. American literature is 
full of statements rating quality over quantity. . . . Most impor­
tant of a l l . .  . for writers and artists is the identification of size 
and growth with pollution in all of its forms—economic, politi­
cal, moral.36 
In the political arena one of the steady syndromes has been 
what I call the "Mr. Clean" one. Since the late nineteenth 
century, groups of Americans, usually affluent reformers, 
have seized on some aspect of American society as dirty and 
have sought to clean it up and reform it. The government, the 
civil service, was one of the first such areas to be cleansed. 
Civil service reform secured its main support base from the 
"Mugwumps," from members of educated old families and 
academe, who saw in corrupt politics a destructive force in 
American life. The concern with corrupt politics was fol­
lowed by the criticisms of the pre-World War I Progressives, 
recruited heavily from the same sources as the Mugwumps, 
who, seeking to clean up the environment, fostered the con­
servation movement. They also were disturbed by the dis­
tructive effect on American cultural values and way of life of 
the vulgar materialism fostered by the nouveaux riches of 
the decades about the turn of the century. These Mr. Clean 
elements have revived in our time in the form of concerns 
about pollution, ecology, and the influence of money on 
politics. Organizations like Common Cause, Nader's Raid­
ers, and the Urban Coalition reflect this tendency. These 
groups have constituted the reform movement of the affluent 
in an affluent society. Dirt, ugliness, corruption, vulgarity, 
disturb those dedicated to the higher life, involved in intel­
lectual activities or coming from privileged families, who 
have not had to dirty themselves in order to become well-
to-do or get a good education. 
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Other advocates of an end to growth argue that advanced 
technological society with its emphasis on division of labor 
has also led, in the words of E. J. Mishan, to "a decline . .  . in 
the satisfactions that men once derived from their daily 
tasks, [and] who is to say that the loss has been fully com­
pensated by the constant proliferation of goods and gadgetry 
and the transformation to a mechanized environment. . . 
Economic growth depends, among other things, on extreme 
specialization that dulls the spirit, narrows the sympathies, 
and cuts one off from the largeness of life."37 But black 
political scientist Willard Johnson contends that Mishan "is 
guilty of debating the issues in terms of values that, for all 
their humaneness, ignore the concerns of the poor. . . . No 
doubt his concerns feed on a genuine consideration for the 
quality of life, but they seem to me mistaken about the 
contribution material goods can make to it."38 Or, as An­
thony Crosland, the foreign secretary in Britain's Labour 
government, argued, those who seek to limit growth to pro­
tect the environment are "kindly and dedicated people. But 
they are affluent; and fundamentally, though of course not 
consciously, they want to kick the ladder down behind 
them."39 
Conversely, the advocates of growth, those who would 
down-play the consequences of pollution, those who are less 
concerned about beauty in the environment, tend to come 
from groups involved in the productive process who want to 
get more for themselves through material advancement. 
They include well-to-do business men, together with work­
ers and poor people who are more interested in increasing 
their economic circumstances, enhancing chances for mo­
bility for their children, getting more education, securing 
access to leisure facilities, and so on. 
Defining or locating the groups supporting varying points 
of view does not, of course, say anything about the validity of 
a given proposition or opinion. Growth may be good or bad, 
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possible or impossible, in the long run, regardless of who 
likes it or dislikes it, or benefits or is harmed by it. Since I am 
not an economist and I have not done firsthand research on 
the conditions of growth or on the limits to growth, I do not 
intend to take a position based on the evaluation of the 
evidence. Rather, I would like to spend the remainder of this 
essay discussing some of the consequences of the no-growth 
scenario. It is possible to bring together some of the evalua­
tions or hunches that have been advanced to describe what 
will happen to the human race as a result. I should note, 
however, that like Herman Kahn I tend to be an optimist 
about growth and innovation. I believe — or perhaps more 
accurately I should say I hope — that we will be able to find 
substitutes for resources that are being depleted, to recycle 
or, more probably, to innovate in various ways that will 
enable the race to continue toward a more affluent and 
hopefully more egalitarian and freer future. I favor the 
growth scenario in part because, as I shall indicate, I think 
the possibilities for much of what I would like to see occur, 
namely, the expansion of freedom and greater equality, are 
linked in my judgment to abundance and to growth. I believe 
that a no-growth society would be a more authoritarian and 
more intensely stratified social system. 
The Consequences of Growth and No-Growth 
Abundance, as David Potter has told us in his brilliant 
book The People of Plenty, lies at the center of efforts to 
explain American exceptionalism.40 Countless European 
observers of the American national scene, such as Toc­
queville and Carlyle, stressed the extent to which the rich­
ness of the American continent with a limited population 
made possible a new social structure, a new man, a new set 
of social relationships that emphasized equality. Most of the 
articles and books written to explain the absence of 
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socialism as a political force and class-consciousness in the 
European sense in the United States have also stressed 
abundance. Werner Sombart put it well in his classic work 
Why Is There No Socialism in the United States of America?: 
"All Socialist Utopias come to nothing on roast beef and 
apple pie."41 
Historians and sociologists have agreed that abundance 
reduces the potential for class tensions. As David Potter 
stated, compared with the class societies in other countries 
and other times the United States has a "new kind of social 
structure in which the strata may be fully demarked but 
where the bases of demarcation are relatively intangible. 
The factor of abundance has exercised a vital influence in 
producing this kind of structure, for it has constantly oper­
ated to equalize the overt differences between the various 
classes and to eliminate the physical distance between them, 
without, however, destroying the barriers which separate 
them."42 
It is obvious, of course, that the United States is not an 
egalitarian country, if by egalitarianism one means anything 
that approaches equality of results. In fact, the most recent 
comparative studies completed under the auspices of the 
OECD indicate that income distribution is more skewed, 
more unequal, in the United States than in the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Norway, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Austra­
lia, although the differences among these relatively affluent 
countries are not very great.43 It may be argued, however, 
that the way in which people perceive the distribution of 
income linked to the distribution of different kinds of con­
sumer goods people use for immediate gratification is more 
important in affecting their feelings about equity than the 
actual distribution of income as such. The distribution of 
consumer goods has tended to become more equitable as the 
size of national income has increased. This relationship 
between wealth and the distribution of consumer goods has 
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been commented on by Gunnar Myrdal: "It is, indeed, a 
regular occurrence that the poorer the country, the greater 
the difference between the poor and rich."44 
This, of course, does not mean that an increase in GNP 
automatically results in a narrowing of the income gap 
among the classes. In less-developed countries such an in­
crease initially may largely go to increasing the wealth of the 
affluent and the standard of living of the middle class, with­
out improving the lot of the large mass of the poor. The 
extent of income inequality in these countries also varies 
greatly with the policies followed by their governments, 
e.g., the variation in spread of education, land distribution, 
population control, production and regional sectors em­
phasized, and the like.4S In addition, it should be noted that a 
number of recent studies of income distribution find rela­
tively little change in income inequality accompanying 
growth since World War II in the wealthy non-communist 
countries.46 Yet, a conclusion that the proportion of the 
national income received by different segments of the popu­
lation does not change much in a given period does not 
imply that the standards of living of the less-privileged may 
not rise considerably, enabling the consumption gap among 
the classes to decline. 
In the United States the average per capita income has 
increased eight times during the course of the century, and 
this dramatic growth has brought about a wide distribution 
of various social and economic benefits, greater than that 
which exists in almost all other countries except for a few of 
the wealthiest ones in Europe. Thus, in America a much 
larger proportion of the population graduates from high 
school (over 80 percent), or enters college (close to 45 per­
cent) than in any other country. The greater wealth of the 
United States also means that consumer goods such as au­
tomobiles and telephones are more evenly distributed here 
than elsewhere. A recent evaluation by the (London) 
94 Growth, Affluence, and the Limits of Futurology 
Economist, using twelve social indicators to assess the rela­
tive advantages of different countries as places to live, 
placed the United States far in the lead over eight other 
industrialized non-communist states.47 
Sociologist Gideon Sjoberg has traced the implications of 
such developments historically in America. He suggests that 
the emergence of mass production during the twentieth 
century has caused such a redistribution of highly valued 
prestige symbols that the distinctions between social classes 
are much less visible now than they were in the nineteenth-
century America, or in most other less-affluent countries. 
Sjoberg argues that the status differences between many 
blue-collar workers and middle-class professionals have be­
come less well-defined, since working-class families, like 
middle-class ones, have been able to buy goods that confer 
prestige on the purchaser—clothing, cars, television sets, 
and so on. Such improvements in style of life help to pre­
serve a belief in the reality of the promise of equality.48 
Economic growth is also associated, of course, with the 
upgrading of the occupational structure, discussed earlier. 
Where Western societies once had many menial jobs at the 
bottom, a pattern that still characterizes less-developed na­
tions, including most communist ones, they have now 
changed and the proportion of reasonably well-rewarded 
positions has increased so that like the United States they 
bulge at the middle. One of the conditions for an increased 
sense of equality and greater opportunity is increased 
mechanization. The most-advanced technological societies, 
such as the United States, Sweden, and Germany, have re­
duced onerous work to a greater degree than others. It 
should be evident that those who foresee or advocate no 
growth, who oppose technological expansion either because 
they do not believe available resources will sustain it or 
because they feel that a more-mechanized system will be a 
dirtier society in a variety of meanings of that term, must 
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anticipate a future in which the possibilities for progress 
toward greater equality will also decline. If we have to stop 
technological development, if we have to move into a no-
growth age, then instead of moving toward greater equality, 
toward upgrading the situation of the poor, we will experi­
ence intense struggles over distribution of consumption 
goods, struggles in which those who control power re­
sources, whether through ownership or capital or control of 
the state, will be at a considerable advantage. 
As Kenneth Boulding has pointed out: 
One reason why the progressive [steady growth] state is 
"cheerful" is that social conflict is diminished by it. In a pro­
gressive state, the poor can become richer without the rich 
becoming poorer. In the stationary state, there is no escape from 
the rigors of scarcity. If one person or group becomes richer, 
then the rest of society must become poorer. Unfortunately, this 
increases the payoffs for successful exploitation—that is, the use 
of organized threat in order to redistribute income. In progres­
sive societies exploitation pays badly, for almost everybody, 
increasing their productivity pays better. One can get ten 
dollars out of nature for every dollar one can squeeze out of a 
fellow man. In the stationary state, unfortunately, investment in 
exploitation may pay better than in progress. Stationary states, 
therefore, are frequently mafia-type societies in which the gov­
ernment is primarily an instrument for redistributing income 
toward the powerful and away from the weak.49 
Robert Heilbroner, who agrees with Boulding that growth 
must cease, notes that a no-growth America will not simply 
involve increased conflict with the upper class and the rich, 
for "the top 5 percent get only 15 percent of all income." The 
working class and the poor cannot improve their situation 
without coming into conflict with the middle class. Thus, he 
says, "when growth slows down, we must expect a struggle 
of redistribution on a vast scale—a confrontation not just 
between a few rich and many poor, but between a relatively 
better-off upper third of the nation and a relatively less 
well-off slightly larger working class. And fighting against 
both will be the bottom 20 percent [who now have only 5 
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percent of the income]—the group with most to gain, the 
least to lose."50 This intensification of the class struggle, of 
course, will go on everywhere. 
In the United States, rising demands for quotas, for af­
firmative action with special advantages for under­
privileged groups like blacks, Chicanos, and women, may be 
portents of the future that Boulding and Heilbroner antici­
pate. The premise of the argument for such quotas, in part, is 
that the only way these hitherto deprived groups can move 
up is at the expense of other groups, that they cannot take 
advantage of the economic expansion of society in the way 
in which white male and Oriental immigrant groups did in 
the past. But the more privileged, who are more powerful, 
will seek to resist such demands in a non-expanding 
economy. 
Richard Zeckhauser also emphasizes that a "no-growth 
society would work most severely against the interests of the 
poorer members of society. If zero economic growth 
were imposed on the current structure of the American 
economy, Lester Thurow has calculated 'the distribution of 
family income would gradually become more unequal, 
blacks would fall farther behind whites, and the share going 
to female earnings would fall below what it would otherwise 
be.1 "S1 
For those who believe that the good society is a democratic 
and free one, it is also necessary to recognize that democracy 
requires abundance, or at least that nations in which opposi­
tion parties, contested elections, and a free press exist are 
largely well-to-do. Currently, with the exception of a limited 
group of poor small countries, the only democratic regimes 
are located in the prosperous regions of Europe, North 
America, Australasia, and Japan. Those nations that have 
maintained stable democratic regimes longest, and in which 
anti-democratic parties are very weak, are the cluster of 
countries that are the wealthiest by far. 
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Classic democratic theory stemming from Aristotle 
suggests that free societies are most likely to be found in 
nations with a preponderant middle class. Societies with a 
large lower impoverished stratum tend either to be oligar­
chies (ruled by a self-perpetuating traditional elite) or tyran­
nies (popular-based dictatorships). 
Sometime ago in discussing the conditions of the demo­
cratic order in Political Man, I elaborated on some of the 
ways in which affluence is related to democracy: 
Increased wealth affects the political role of the middle 
class by changing the shape of the stratification structure from 
an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a 
diamond with a growing middle class. A large middle class 
tempers conflict by rewarding moderate and democratic parties 
and penalizing extremist groups. 
The political values and style of the upper class, too, are 
related to national income. The poorer a country and the lower 
the absolute standard of living of the lower classes, the greater 
the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower as vulgar, 
innately inferior, a lower caste beyond the pale of human socie­
ty. The sharp difference in the style of living between those at 
the top and those at the bottom makes this psychologically 
necessary. Consequently, the upper strata in such a situation 
tend to regard political rights for the lower strata, particularly 
the right to share power, as essentially absurd and immoral. The 
upper strata not only resist democracy themselves; their often 
arrogant political behavior serves to intensify extremist reac­
tions on the part of the lower classes. 
The general income level of a nation also affects its receptivity 
to democratic norms. If there is enough wealth in the country so 
that it does not make too much difference whether some redis­
tribution takes place, it is easier to accept the idea that it does not 
matter greatly which side is in power. But if loss of office means 
serious losses for major power groups, they will seek to retain or 
secure office by any means available. A certain amount of na­
tional wealth is likewise necessary to ensure a competent civil 
service. The poorer the country, the greater the emphasis on 
nepotism—support of kin and friends. And this in turn reduces 
the opportunity to develop the efficient bureaucracy which a 
modern democratic state requires. 
Intermediary organizations which act as sources of counter­
vailing power seem to be similarly associated with national 
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wealth. Tocqueville and other exponents of what has come to be 
known as the theory of the "mass society" have argued that a 
country without a multitude of organizations relatively inde­
pendent of the central state power has a high dictatorial as well 
as revolutionary potential. Such organizations serve a number 
of functions: they inhibit the state or any single source of private 
power from dominating all political resources; they are a source 
of new opinions; they can be the means of communicating ideas, 
particularly opposition ideas, to a large section of the citizenry; 
they train men in political skills and so help to increase the level 
of interest and participation in politics. Although there are no 
reliable data on the relationship between national patterns of 
voluntary organization and national political systems, evidence 
from studies of individual behavior demonstrates that, regard­
less of other factors, men who belong to associations are more 
likely than others to give the democratic answer to questions 
concerning tolerance and party systems, to vote, or to partici­
pate actively in politics. Since the more well-to-do and better 
educated a man is, the more likely he is to belong to voluntary 
organizations, the propensity to form such groups seems to be a 
function of level of income and opportunities for leisure within 
given nations.52 
The assumption that abundance is a necessary condition 
for a good society is not limited to the example, or the 
writing, of people who prefer the kinds of societies that have 
emerged in the so-called Western world. At the root of the 
Marxist theories of progress and of the conditions required 
for a free socialist society is a similar assumption. Marx 
fervently believed and sought to demonstrate that inequali­
ty, the exploitation of people by each other, reflected the 
necessary social conditions imposed on societies by scarci­
ty. As I noted earlier, the one major precondition for 
socialism is abundance. Socialism, according to Marx and 
Engels, must be a highly prosperous, what we now call 
post-industrial, society. They assumed that as long as there 
are not sufficient goods available to enable all people to live 
in comparative luxury, that inequality of income and power 
is necessary. They believed, as Trotsky has pointed out, that 
efforts to create socialism, a more egalitarian society, before 
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an era of overwhelming abundance would inevitably fail, 
that intense stratification must recur. 
Marxist theory places an even greater emphasis on the 
relationship between abundance and political and social 
structure than does democratic theory. For according to the 
Marxist fathers, coercive social systems, that is stratified 
ones, are a product of the division of labor inherent in the 
need to produce goods and services in societies charac­
terized by scarcity. For people to become totally free and 
equal, they must have complete control of their own destiny. 
They must be able to choose and control their own work and 
their conditions of life. Economies based on the division of 
labor also require power relationships. Engels, in his essay 
"On Authority," wrote that over the entrance of every fac­
tory should be written, "He who enters here gives up his 
freedom."53 It is clear from reading the essay that Engels was 
not just talking about factories in capitalist society, that he 
meant this generalization to hold under all conditions in 
which factories and the division of labor existed. Marx, on 
one of the few occasions in which he described socialist 
societies, portrayed them as societies in which men would 
be free to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and 
criticize or read poetry in the evening.54 It seems evident that 
Marx and Engels looked forward to a society in which all the 
onerous, menial work is done by machines.55 Socialism 
would be a free society because work would be handled by 
inanimate slaves, in which no one lacked for what he re­
quired in the way of food, clothing, or shelter, and in which 
people enjoyed the luxuries that only the well-to-do have in 
a pre-communist world. 
Marx strongly rejected Malthusian arguments that abun­
dance is not possible, that the relationship among produc­
tivity, raw materials, and the growth of population would 
prevent continued increases in the per capita income, not 
only because these arguments seemed wrong to him, but 
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clearly because if they were true, then socialism is impossi­
ble. Communist theorists like Lenin, Trotsky, and Gramsci, 
all wrote in exuberant terms about American mass produc­
tion because they believed that advanced techniques made 
socialism possible. Henry Ford, in spite of his reactionary 
political views and industrial practices, was a hero to the 
Russian Communists of the 1920s because of his develop­
ment of the assembly line and mass production. Soviet fac­
tories contained pictures of Lenin and Ford.S6 And, of 
course, this worship of the god of productivity and abun­
dance continues in the Soviet Union today. Au­
thoritarianism and inequality are justified as leading to in­
creased productivity, which will ultimately make an egali­
tarian communist society possible. 
The revival in different ways of doctrines of neo-
Malthusianism, the "limits to growth" thesis, the concern 
for the relationship of limited natural resources to growing 
populations, must be seen, therefore, not only as a matter of 
analytic and policy concern with respect to deciding 
whether there are effective limits to growth and, if so, what 
the social consequences of a world in which productivity 
will no longer increase would be. It is also necessary to 
recognize that the end of the dream of universal abundance, 
of a world in which all nations will be richer than contem­
porary America or northern Europe, is an end also to the 
dream of a democratic world, or of an egalitarian socialist 
world, at least in terms of the assumptions of the classic 
theorists of democracy and of socialism. This does not mean, 
of course, in terms of these theories and of our own experi­
ence, that a socialist or communist world, as exemplified by 
countries that now describe themselves by these labels, is 
impossible. State-dominated societies, total government 
economies, are possible at any level of productivity or abun­
dance. Communism exists in countries that range in 
economic levels from totally agrarian societies like Cam­
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bodia to moderately industrialized ones like the Soviet 
Union. 
From a Marxian perspective, Trotsky argued that such 
systems must be authoritarian and inegalitarian, that they 
would be failures from the point of the communist objec­
tives.57 The argument, in fact, has been made by Karl 
Wittfogel and others that the statist communist societies of 
today are actually forms of the type of social system that 
Marx called Asiatic. Asiatic societies in the Marxist 
framework existed in the ancient world, mainly in Asia and 
North Africa. They were characterized by state-dominated 
economies. The state was the central economic and power 
institution because of the need to control elaborate systems 
of irrigation and waterworks over large territories. They 
were statist, highly inegalitarian, and tyrannical. Wittfogel 
in his book Oriental Despotism contends that contemporary 
communism is a revival of Asiatic society in the Marxian 
sense, that it is an intensely stratified one and cannot lead to 
any social order that might resemble communism in the 
Marxist sense.S8 Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism has collec­
tivized scarcity, and inequality and tyranny are necessary 
concomitants of such a system. 
The dangers involved in increased state power are not 
limited to less-developed communist societies. As Mancur 
Olson has noted: 
Another characteristic that no-growth societies have is an 
extraordinary degree of governmental or other collective action. 
This would be true whether growth ceased through ZEG and 
ZPG policies now or because growth had someday proceeded to 
the point where it was obviously and immediately impossible to 
grow any further. Whether it became so by choice or by necessi­
ty, a no-growth society would presumably have stringent regu­
lations and wide-ranging prohibitions against pollution and 
other external diseconomies, and thus more government control 
over individual behavior than is now customary in the Western 
democracies. . Thus there is reason to ask how well democ­
racy as we know it would fare amidst the ubiquitous controls 
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that would be involved either in stopping growth now or in 
adjusting ultimately to the inescapable environmental con­
straint.59 
Those who support "no growth" in order to secure a more 
moral and cleaner society, of course, reject these pessimistic 
scenarios on value grounds. They, too, favor a more egalita­
rian and freer society. It is not possible for any of us to 
categorically say that our preferences are unattainable under 
either conditions of growth or no growth. Obviously, growth 
societies like the United States have not avoided major dys­
functions, severe inequality, poverty, racial tensions, and 
the like. But conversely, the best single example of a de­
veloped no-growth economy, albeit involuntarily, Great Bri­
tain, which has been governed by humane social democrats 
who believe in planning to advance egalitarianism and the 
quality of life, suggests problems even greater than those 
that accompany growth and affluence. The British people 
have shown in a variety of ways that they want the kinds of 
changes that are dependent on growth. As British political 
scientist Rudolf Klein notes, they want more. 
Resentment of continuing inequalities is compounded by re­
sentment of unemployment and of the failure of living standards 
to rise. For poverty is not just relative. Rising standards can and 
do mean better food, better housing, and better clothes for 
people. And at the current British standard of living—the "stan­
dard" for the future, let it be remembered—these sorts of im­
provements still matter very much. Although Britain probably 
has better housing conditions than most Western European 
countries, 13 per cent of households still lack private bathrooms 
and 12 per cent still live in houses or flats officially classified as 
unfit for human habitation. More than a third of households 
have no refrigerator or cooling machine, 55 per cent have no car, 
65 per cent have no telephone, and 70 per cent have no central 
heating.60 
Most of those who believe that we must or should move 
into a "no-growth" era do not want consciously to condemn 
those living in abysmal poverty, particularly in the less­
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developed nations, to remain at that level. Rather, they see 
the need to reduce the standard of living of the affluent 
nations, to transfer access to resources to the less well-to-do 
so that they can at least partially catch up. Ignoring the 
question of how this can be done politically, it is unfortu­
nately necessary to point out that the wealth of the former is 
not primarily a function of their control of resources. 
"Natural resources account for only 5 percent of the value of 
goods and services produced in the U.S. and other de­
veloped countries." Thus, cutting back on American con­
sumption will not enable other non-industrialized nations 
to sharply increase their level of productivity. As Nathan 
Keyfitz points out: "The trouble is that goods, as well as jobs 
that require materials, fit into other social activities in an 
interlocking scheme that is hard to change; social configura­
tions are as solid a reality as raw materials."61 
Conclusions 
Some may look forward to the negative social conse­
quences of no-growth anticipated by various observers, 
since they believe that an intensification of class conflict 
will bring about an end to capitalism and help to inaugurate 
a more humane egalitarian and cooperative society. Such 
hopes have been effectively answered by Robert Heilbroner, 
who is not only one of the most sophisticated exponents of 
the neo-Malthusian view but is also one of the leading 
socialist economists in the United States.62 (He happens to 
be the Norman Thomas Professor of Economics at the New 
School for Social Research.) Heilbroner, however, sees the 
end of growth bringing in its vein the end of the possibilities 
for a more humane, freer, and more egalitarian world. 
The need to limit growth under a system of private owner­
ship of capital, under "stationary capitalism," will, in his 
judgment, result in severe internal dislocations and con­
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sequent great strife. "A stationary capitalism is forced 
to confront the explosive issue of income distribution in a 
way that an expanding capitalism is spared."63 
He concludes, correctly in my opinion, that the govern­
ment in such societies "faced with extreme internal strife or 
with potentially social polarization, would resort to au­
thoritarian measures."64 But though a democratic socialist, 
he does not believe that a socialist society can do better. As 
he puts it: 
A democratically governed socialism would very likely face 
the same Hobbesian struggle for goods as a democratically gov­
erned capitalism; and whereas an authoritarian socialism could 
certainly enforce some kind of solution, it seems likely that this 
would entail a degree of coercion that would make "social 
ism" virtually indistinguishable from an authoritarian "capital­
ism."65 
Earlier, I indicated that I prefer to accept the optimistic 
views of those economists who believe that necessity is the 
mother of invention, that sufficient need, a high enough 
price, will engender the kinds of innovations that will make 
continued growth possible in ways that will also reduce the 
morbidities of an industrialized civilization. Historical ex­
perience, as Nathan Keyfitz has pointed out, "shows the 
resilience of the productive system, its ability to substitute 
commoner materials for scarce ones."66 But it is unclear 
whether invention and innovation can occur fast enough to 
avoid disaster. In the debate "between pessimistic raw mate­
rial experts and optimistic economists," there is a "middle­
ground to which both sides are tending that every 
barrier that industrial expansion is now meeting can be 
surmounted by technological expansion, but not in an in­
stant."67 As Keyfitz emphasizes, 
What will make a decisive difference is knowledge: of how to 
produce amenities with less material, how to substitute mate­
rials that are common for those that are scarce, how to get 
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desired results with less energy and how to obtain that energy 
from renewable sources rather than from fossil fuels. We have 
seen some results in the past decade. With the advent of inte­
grated circuits, a calculator that cost $1,000 and weighed 40 
pounds is now replaced by one that costs $10 and weighs a few 
ounces. Artificial earth satellites have lowered the cost of com­
munication; they provide television in Indian villages and may 
ultimately make telephone calls around the world as cheap as 
local calls. Synthetic polymers have replaced cotton and wool 
and thus released land. The list of what is still needed is too long 
to itemize: efficient solar collectors, compact storage batteries to 
run automobiles on centrally generated power, stronger and 
cheaper plastics (for automobile bodies, for instance) and so 
68 on.
The bottleneck is clearly the lack of sufficient incentives 
to create and to mobilize the necessary talent to provide the 
needed inventions and to speed up the time it takes to 
"convert knowledge into the production of goods." America 
has led the world in the past in such developments. It has 
slowed down in spite of the greater need. We must devote 
ourselves to the task of finding ways to break this bottleneck 
in our knowledge and technique, both on technical and 
social levels. 
People, as Marx emphasized, make their own history. 
Nothing is inevitable except death. Let us not be paralyzed 
by numbers that do not give us the sum we would like to see. 
We can continue to change the equation. The future can be 
what we make of it, not what the futurologists predict. 
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$4.00 
Scarcity and abundance of prime resources have exerted 
a profound shaping influence on the evolution of the Ameri­
can sociopolitical system; yet the nature, extent, and conse­
quences of the supply of these resources are often matters 
of differing perceptions and judgments rather than ob­
jective determinations. Evaluation of conflicting estimates, 
predictions, and proposals, though a sometimes elusive 
exercise, is becoming increasingly important. Side by side 
with these contending points of view is the sober recogni­
tion (and admission) of mounting errors in past calculations 
and of grave actual or potential limitations on economic 
growth, on critical resources, on the current stock of 
analytic tools, and on the effectiveness of policy processes. 
Moreover, given that volatile public moods play as large a 
role as technical analysis, it is increasingly suggested that 
a thoroughgoing redefinition of society is required, based 
on an acceptance of the limits of our power, individual and 
social, to deal with unlimited appetites and wants. 
The three essays presented here offer firm grounds — 
empirical, logical, historical, pragmatic, and philosophical 
— for prudent optimism that contemporary institutions and 
policies can cope effectively with both the opportunity and 
the threat inherent in unforeseen resource scarcities and 
shortages, in the dilemmas surrounding growth and no-
growth, and in the age-old counterpulls between wants 
or needs and the sum total of the available means to satisfy 
them. 
